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ABSTRACT

The values, attitudes, and beliefs which humans hold regarding
mankind's role in the universe must be understood if the natural
environment is to be preserved.

In this study, the utility of the

construct "anthropocentrism" as an organizing principle for understand
ing consistencies among individuals' attitudes regarding man's role in
nature was explored.

Anthropocentrism was defined as a doctrine which

posits humanity as the center of the universe and sees the well being
of mankind as the ultimate purpose of things.

The various attitudinal

manifestations and historical roots of anthropocentrism were explored,
and the sparse empirical literature relevant to this construct was
reviewed.

Subsequently, the construct validity of "anthropocentrism"

was empirically investigated, as was the validity of the operational
measure of this construct, the Anthropocentrism Scale.
A factor analysis using a principal components method with a
varimax

rotation yielded nine factors.

Most relevant to the construct

validity of "anthropocentrism" was the finding of a "pure anthropocen
trism" first factor.

This factor contained high loadings for items which

directly state the central anthropocentric value judgement;
the most important entity in the universe.

that man is

The centrality of this

value judgement within the anthropocentric ideology was thereby demon
strated.

Correlational data indicated that anthropocentrism is unre

lated to attitudes toward humanity per se, but rather, that
anthropocentrism is a construct which refers to the value attributed to
man relative to the value attributed to the nonhuman environment. A
vi

moderate positive correlation was obtained between anthropocentrism and
ethnocentrism, indicating that anthropocentrism may represent an exten
sion of ethnocentric thinking.

In other words, ethnocentric individuals

are likely to identify with mankind as an ingroup only if provided with
a suitable outgroup which can be devalued, such as the nonhuman environ
ment.

Contrary to expectation, anthropocentrism was found to be

unrelated to egocentrism and locus of control.

Anthropocentrism was

also explored in terms of man-nature value orientations (man-under/with/
or over-nature), and various reported behaviors.

It was concluded that

anthropocentrism is a useful construct for understanding values
regarding man-nature interactions, and that the relation of this con
struct to other constructs and actual behaviors should be explored
further.
The Anthropocentrism Scale was found to be unaffected by social
desirability set.

In addition, variance attributable to irrelevant

content was found to be excessive, though not extensive.

It was con

cluded that this scale is currently an adequate measure of anthropo
centrism, though a better scale may be possible as the universe of
attitudinal and behavioral manifestations of anthropocentrism becomes
better delineated.

Finally, it was recommended that Factor 1 be

employed as a measure of "pure anthropocentrism," thereby complementing
the use of total score on the Anthropocentrism Scale.
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INTRODUCTION

In recent years, man has become increasingly aware of the inter
dependence among components of nature, as well as the impact of man's
accelerating environmental control upon this balance.

In a study

which formed the foundation for the research reported herein, Chandler
(Note 1) examined the utility of the construct "anthropocentrism" for
understanding the basis of observed consistencies among individuals'
attitudes regarding man's perceived role in the natural world.

In

accordance with Eysenck and Arnold (1972), anthropocentrism was de
fined as "A doctrine or theory which elevates man as the center of the
world, and sees the well being of humanity as the ultimate purpose of
things."

The 1978 Chandler study involved an examination of the

relatedness of various attitudes which supposedly reflect an anthropo
centric outlook, and resulted in the development of an operational
measure of anthropocentrism (see Appendix A ) .

The purpose of the

present study was to accumulate additional data relevant to the con
struct validity of anthropocentrism as well as the validity of its
operational measure, the Anthropocentrism Scale.

In the process of

accumulating validity data, evidence was also collected regarding
certain motives which may contribute to the adoption of anthropocen
tric attitudes.

Before proceeding further, however, an examination of

various facets and historical roots of an anthropocentric ideology is
in order.

For this purpose, speculative and empirical literature

available on the topic of anthropocentrism are reviewed below.
First of all, the foundation of an anthropocentric stance

1

2

involves a subjective statement of value postulating man (i.e.,
humanity, mankind) as the most important of all forms of life.

Sub

scription to this value judgement is, by definition, the sina qua non
of a truly anthropocentric ideology.

A given individual may recog

nize the subjective nature of the valuation process, or he may
unwittingly project his conviction of human preeminence, considering
it to be part of the natural order.

In either case, however, this

value judgement forms the core of an anthropocentric stance.

This

contention was empirically substantiated by results of the Chandler
study showing that the two items which explicitly state this
value judgement (Item #6:
earth," and item #29:

"Man is the most important species on

"Man is the most significant entity in the uni

verse") ranked first (.660) and third (.596) respectively in average
item-test correlations among items appearing on the initial three
forms of the Anthropocentrism Scale (see Appendix B).

In a related

vein, it might be noted that the two items explicitly stating a belief
in human "superiority" (Item #14, "Humans are superior to all other
animals in all important respects," and item #22, "No matter how we
define 'superiority,' it seems that man must be considered superior to
all known forms of life") ranked second (.634) and fourth (.590)
respectively in average item-test correlation.

In this regard, it

should be noted that like the word "important," "superiority" is a
term heavily laden with positive connotative value.

Its denotation is

ambiguous, and fully surfaces only by reference to the criteria used
to judge superiority, the selection of which is rather arbitrary, sub
jective, and potentially self-enhancing.

The above results indicating
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the centrality of value laden items referring to human importance and
superiority lend support to the contention that "human preeminence"
is the central value underlying the varied attitudinal complex termed
anthropocentrism.

Focus will now be shifted to the variety of atti

tudes, beliefs, and behaviors which tend to be associated with this
central value judgement.
Elder (1970) distinguished between the "exclusionist" and "inclusionist" schools of thought regarding the relation between man and
the rest of nature.

Regarding the relative degree of anthropocentrism

in these two contrasting philosophies, Elder summarized,
First and foremost, obviously, is the fact that the exclusionists
concentrate on man and make him the measure of all creation.
Even the theologians who ultimately focus on God present God as
'support datum1 for the activity and centrality of man. Over
against this the inclusionists refuse to make man such a single
center of attention. They do not demean man and his activities;
they simply say that an overconcentration on humanity ignores
the importance of life in its full variety and, paradoxically,
ultimately works against the welfare of man (Elder, 1970, pp.
78-79).
In addition to the marked anthropocentric bias in the exclusionist
tradition, a dualism between man and environment can be detected.

Such

a dualism between man and nature can be viewed as a natural outgrowth
of a dualistic view of man himself in terms of mind and matter, or
body and soul (O'Briant, 1974), with man's intellectual and spiritual
capacity being considered distinctly human.

A topic to be discussed

later might be anticipated at this point by noting that the tendency of
Elder's exclusionist school to emphasize the differences, rather than
the similarities and interrelations between man and nature, is reminis
cent of the ethnocentric individual's set to perceive others in terms
of group membership.

Compared with exclusionists, the less
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anthropocentric inclusionist school tends to think of man iji the en
vironment, that is, man as an inextricable element in the complex,
holistic web of nature.

Elder also noted that a persistent theme among

inclusionists, besides holism and equalitarianism, is an emphasis upon
the uniqueness of the individual (reminiscent of the nonethnocentric
individual's readiness to respond interpersonally on the basis of
individual differences rather than group membership). Results from
the Chandler study support Elder's view that anthropocentrism tends to
be associated with a dualistic view of man and the environment
(average item-test correlation* of .540 for item #12:

"It is best to

think of man as just one of many members of the animal world") in
which differences rather than similarities between man and other forms
of life are emphasized (average item-test correlation of .380 for
item #1:

"The differences between human beings and animals are more

numerous than the similarities").
In one of the few empirical studies pertaining to anthropocen
trism, Kluckhohn and Strodtbeck (1961) examined the value orienta
tions of five culturally distinctive communities in the Rimrock region
of the American Southwest.

They employed a five item instrument to

investigate values regarding the relationship between man and nature,
with each item requiring the respondent to indicate his preference
between three different approaches to a concrete issue of man-nature
relations. These three approaches respectively involved man in

*The scoring of all negatively phrased items is reversed, with
the result that a high score on any item is indicative of an anthropo
centric response. Thus, all item-test correlations are positive.
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subjugation to nature, in harmony with nature (analogous to Elder's
inclusionist tradition), or with mastery over nature (analogous to
Elder's exclusionist tradition).

Kluckhohn and Strodtbeck found that

the subjugated-to-nature value orientation was significantly preferred
only in the Spanish-American village they sampled, and described this
orientation as involving a fatalistic acceptance of illness, death, and
natural disaster.

They described the mastery-over-nature position as

involving a belief that natural forces of all kinds are to be overcome
and put to the use of human beings, a belief in man-made medical
care for the control of illness and lengthening of life, an attitude
that "the Lord helps those who help themselves," and a strong empha
sis on the use of technology to fulfill man's duty to overcome
obstacles.

This value orientation was found to be the preferred

position among the English speaking communities sampled by Kluckhohn
and Strodbeck.

In a community of homesteaders originally from

Texas and Oklahoma, the man-over-nature orientation was significantly
preferred over the two alternative positions.

In a Mormon village,

the man-over-nature and harmony-with-nature positions were sig
nificantly preferred over the subjugation-to-nature orientation.
The harmony-with-nature orientation was more prominent, though not
clearly predominant, among the two American Indian cultures sampled.
This orientation maintains that there is no real separation of man,
nature, and the supernatural; rather, one is simply an extension of
the other, with a sense of wholeness emerging from the unity of these
components.

Kluckhohn and Strodtbeck add that this orientation

appears to have been dominant in many periods of Chinese history, and
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is strongly evident in past and present Japanese culture.

Among the

cultures sampled, the harmony-with-nature position was found to be
significantly preferred over the subjugation-to-nature position among
members of a decentralized Navaho Indian band.

Otherwise, differ

ences among value orientations were insignificant, both in the Navaho
community, and among a highly centralized pueblo of Zuni Indians.
Translating this triad of value orientations into terms used
herein, the highly anthropocentric man-over-nature orientation was
found to characterize the English speaking, northern European
extract cultures studied..

On the other hand, the less Westernized

Spanish-American and American Indian cultures tended to prefer a
relatively nonanthropocentric stance, whether it be the subjugatedto-nature position, or the harmony-with-nature position.

While the

meaning of low scores on the Anthropocentrism Scale will be discussed
later, it is important to note at this point that there are at least
two nonanthropocentric stances:

a somewhat fatalistic (or perhaps

even misanthropic) view that man is rightfully subjugated to nature,
and the more omnicentric view that man is inextricably related to and
preferably in harmony with the whole of nature.
While the topology and results of Kluckhohn and Strodtbeck's
study are quite informative, their research suffers from methodologi
cal weaknesses involving failure to report internal consistency,
reliability, and validity data for their five-item questionnaire.

A

more recent study by Kameron (1975) used the same man over-with-under
nature typology as its departure point, but involved considerably more
sophistication methodologically.

Accordingly, this study will be
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reviewed in detail.

Kameron started with 267 items representing the

"over,11 "with," and "under" man-nature value orientations, with judges
subaequently eliminating ambiguous or irrelevant items to produce a 182
item scale.

This scale was then factor analyzed, and reduced to the 93

items which loaded highest on the obtained factors.

The 93 item scale

was again factor analyzed, and produced eight orthogonal factors,
accounting for 25.7% of the total variance in the data.

The man over-

with-under typology was found capable of describing the major portion
of the majority of factors, as might be expected given the use of this
typology to generate the initial item pool.

The obtained factors and

their correlates were as follows.
Factor 1, accounting for 10.4% of the variance, was labelled
"conservationist-exploitationist," and was based primarily on acceptance
or rejection of man-with-nature items (factor scores were derived from
responses to 13 "with" items, three "over" items, and one "under" item).
Persons scoring high on Factor 1 were conservationist minded, and
expressed a willingness to make financial sacrifices and changes in
life style in order to preserve the environment. --Low scorers, or
"exploiters," were willing to pay more for consumer goods such as elec
tricity rather than reduce consumption, were generally unwilling to pay
taxes -to clean up pollution (even though they tended to see ecological
solutions in terms of financial expenditures rather than lifestyle
changes), and were more likely to be frequent churchgoers.

This ex-

ploitationist orientation appears to be quite consistent with an anthro
pocentric stance.
and

Factor 2 (non man-under-nature vs. man-under-nature

hostile toward animals), accounting for 4.5% of the variance (each

remaining factor accounted for less than 3% of the variance) was a
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clearcut man-under-nature unipolar dimension (14 "under" items, four
"over" items, and one "with" item loaded on this factor).

Persons

accepting the man-under-nature orientation tended to be oblivious to
environmental concerns, and were seen as harboring a general pessimism
mixed with hostility toward nature.

Contrary to expectation, natural

hazards were found to be more frequently experienced by those rejecting
the man-under-nature orientation than by those accepting it.

It was

unclear whether rejection of the man-under-nature position was a defense
mechanism designed to deny the potency of nature in the face of such
hazards, or whether their more frequent contact with nature (relative to
persons agreeing with the man-under-nature position) more adequately
explains the greater hazard proneness of these individuals.
Kameron's factor 3, labelled "non-fear of outdoors vs. fear of
outdoors" was composed primarily of raan-with and man-under-nature items.
Persons without fear of the outdoors tended to be male, involved in male
stereotyped careers or majors, and likely to endorse strong environ
mental actions.

The main difference between this factor and factor 2

was that fear-of-outdoor types were less hostile to environmental con
cerns than were man-under-nature types.

Factor 4, labelled "anti

technology v s . pro-technology" consisted almost entirely of raan-overnature items and appeared to indicate "acceptance or non-acceptance of
some of the modern beliefs that stem from an exploitationist, consumerist,
homeocentric society" (p. 71).

High scorers disagreed with items sug

gesting a need for science and technology in many areas of life, and
disagreed that technology can solve our problems.

Factor 4 was not

significantly correlated with factor 1, thereby indicating that
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rejection of technology does not necessarily imply adoption of a con
servation ethic.

Indeed, whereas factor 1 was significantly correlated

with involvement in ecological activities, factor 4 was not.

Thus,

anti-technology attitudes are not consistently translated into a con
servationist lifestyle.

Factor 6 involved acceptance vs. rejection of

"natural" lifestyles (eating health foods; adoption of a "simple" life
style).

Acceptance of such a life style was found to be predictive of

involvement in outdoor life but, once again, unrelated to involvement
in ecology related activities.

A clear age relationship was noted on

factor 6, with young persons more likely to endorse the natural life
style.

High scores were interpreted as indicative of a desire to

"escape to nature."

The three remaining factors (#5: anti-gardens vs.

pro-gardens; #7: pro-gasoline engines vs. anti-gasoline engines; and
#8: man-under-nature vs. man-over-nature on medical issues) account for
minimal variance and appear to be more related to specific objects of
attitudes determined by initial selection of item content than to dis
tinct underlying value orientations.

Finally, it should be noted that

the 33 items of the Marlowe-Crowne Social Desirability Scale were com
bined in a random sort with the 93 item scale to produce the 126 item
measure actually employed in Karaeron's study.

Social desirability items

did not, however, contribute to factor scores, and were insignificantly
related to the obtained factors, with the exception of minimal correla
tions for factor #5 (r=-.15) and factor #6 (r=+.14)

This finding sug

gests that there is only minimal consensus regarding the social
desirability of value orientations regarding the relation of man and
nature.
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Although the Kameron scale and the Anthropocentrism Scale both
endeavor to measure man-nature value orientations, they appear to tap
somewhat different issues.

The Kameron scale seeks to measure three

distinctly different value orientations:
nature.

man over-, with-, and under

These orientations refer to values regarding the preferred

balance.of control or power between man and nature.

The Anthropocentism

Scale, on the other hand, is intended to be a unipolar measure of one's
level of man-centeredness, and of the man-over-nature attitudes which
follow from such anthropocentrism.

As with other unipolar scales, it

is easier to say what low scores on the A-scale do not measure, then
what they do measure.

In terms of Kluckhohn and Strodtbeck's typology,

it seems that low scores would involve rejection of man-over-nature
values, though it is not clear to what extent man-with-nature and/or
man-under-nature values would be endorsed by low scorers on the Anthro
pocentrism Scale.

Data comparing the Anthropocentrism Scale with

various factors derived from the Kameron scale would provide validity
information regarding the meaning of low as well as high scores on the
Anthropocentrism Scale.
Kluckhohn and Strodtbeck (1961) and Kameron (1975) thus appear to
be the only currently available empirical studies which specifically
investigate values regarding man's proper relationship with nature.
Given the emergence of Environmental Psychology in the last decade, how
ever, this state of affairs is likely to change soon.

Already a number

of scales have been published measuring environmental dispositions, and
research investigating the personality correlates of such dispositions
is beginning to gain momentum.

A review of some of the currently
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available measures of environmental attitudes may help clarify the
nature of the conceptual overlap between such scales and the Anthro
pocentrism Scale.

The Ecology Scale (Maloney et al., 1975) is comprised

of four subscales, namely, a Verbal Commitment (VC) subscale measuring
what a person states he is willing to do in reference to environmentpollution issues, an Actual Commitment (AC) subscale measuring what a
person states he actually does in relation to these issues, an Affect
(A) subscale measuring the level of emotionality related to ecological
issues, and a Knowledge (K) subscale measuring factual knowledge
related to ecological issues.

The Environmental Response Inventory

(McKechnie, 1977) is a relatively broad bandwidth device designed both
to identify and measure the most salient types of environmental dis
positions in man.

The E.R.I. includes six factor-analytically derived

subscales (Pastoralism, Urbanism, Environmental Adaptation, Stimulus
Seeking, Environmental Trust, and Antiquarianism), with two additional
subscales (Need for Privacy, Mechanical Orientation) as well as a
validity scale (Coramunality) being added later.

The Environmental

Preference Questionnaire (Kaplan, 1977) contains seven subscales,
respectively measuring preference for natural settings, romantic escape
from the urban/suburban scene, preference for modern housing and
industrial development, preference for the suburbs, enjoyment of social
izing, passive reactions to stress, and preference of cities.

Lounsbury

and Tornatzky (1977) employed cluster analysis in developing a device
containing three factors/subscales:

concern for environmental degrada

tion, concern for environmental action, and concern for overpopulation.
Examination of the subscales tapped by these four prominent measures
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indicates that the environmental attitudes sampled by these scales at
times includes, but is certainly not restricted to views regarding the
proper relation between mankind and the environment.

Such measures tap

a more global universe of attitudes toward the physical (man-made and
natural) environment, and on this basis can be distinguished from the
more narrow pursuits of Kluckhohn and Strodtbeck (1961), Kameron (1975),
Chandler (Note 1) and the present study.
Further understanding of various facets of an anthropocentric
ideology can be obtained by reviewing additional data from the 1978
Chandler study.

Results indicated that an anthropocentric individual

(person scoring high on the Anthropocentrism Scale) is likely to endorse
human use of the environment for self-serving purposes (average itemtest correlations of .371, .347, .446, and .444 respectively for items
#3:

"Man should control the environment for his own benefit as much as

possible," #7:

"It is wrong for scientists to try to find cures for

human diseases by experimentally producing these diseases in animals,"
#10:

"Humans should show more respect for the rights of animals and

plants," and #30:

"The primary value of an animal or plant lies in its

ability to serve human needs").

This self-serving control appears to be

exerted with minimal ethical preconsideration or subsequent regret for
the adverse environmental consequences of such behavior (as indicated by
average item-test correlations of .355, .499, .435, and .440 respec
tively for items #5:

"It is wrong to pick flowers for their beauty

value, because in so doing we destroy the life of the flower," #21:
"Governments should adopt policies which ensure the survival of the
human species, even if other species become extinct as a result," #24:
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"I occasionally feel that it is morally wrong to eat meat," and #28:
"Sometimes my conscience prevents me from killing bothersome flies and
insects").

The anthropocentric individual's belief in human superiority

tends to be at least partially based on the use of self-enhancing
criteria of superiority, as indicated by an average item-test correla
tion of .393 for item #17:

"Degree of intelligence ought to be the main

measure for determining the superiority of one species over another."
This conclusion assumes the premise that research participants consid
ered humans to be the most intelligent form of life.

Results also

indicated that belief in human superiority on this planet tends to be
supplemented by the conviction that advanced extra-terrestial life is
either nonexistent or inferior to man, as indicated by average itemtest correlations of .348, .402, and .259 respectively for items #2:

"It

is quite possible that highly advanced civilizations exist in other parts
of the universe," #9:

"If we eventually discover life in other parts of

the universe, such life will probably be found to be inferior to human
life," and #15:

"It is likely that 'flying saucers' are presently

visiting earth."' While the various values, attitudes, beliefs, and '
behavioral dispositions discussed above are not necessarily coexistent,
the generally moderate item-test correlations do indicate a considerable
degree of consistency.

The extent of this logical and statistical con

sistency seems sufficient to defend the use of the construct "anthro
pocentrism" to encompass this multifaceted attitudinal constellation.
Before turning to additional requirements for construct validation,
attention is now briefly focused on some of the historical developments
which have reflected, fostered, or undercut anthropocentrism.

The
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intent here is merely to highlight certain major historical markers, not
to minutely trace the history of anthropocentrism.

It should be empha

sized, however, that such markers occur only upon a background of
subtle historical change in man's behavior and ideas regarding the
natural world. A full treatment of such changes can be found in
Glacken (1967), who intricately examined the historical course of the
relationship of human culture to the natural environment by focusing
on the development of three ideas:

(a) the theological assumption that

the planet is purposefully designed and ordered (whether for man alone,
as the highest being of creation, or for the hierarchy of life with man
at the apex), (b) the idea of environmental influences upon man, and (c)
the idea of man as a geographic agent, working as a partner of God to
improve upon and cultivate an earth created for himself.

In regard to

the latter notion, Glacken examined the development of the "steward
ship" view of man's relation to nature in classical Greek and JudeoChristian thought, and concluded,
The theme that man, sinful though he be, occupies a position on
earth comparable to that of God in the universe, as a personal
possession, a realm of stewardship, has been one of the key
ideas in the religious and philosophical thought of Western
civilization regarding man's place in nature (Glacken, 1967,
p. 155).
The notion of stewardship, of man supervising, completing, and even
improving upon the creation of God, helped provide a rationale for those
who would exploit nature for self-serving ends.

The anthropocentric

aspects of this notion of stewardship seemed to reach full blossom in
the emergence of Christianity.

Indeed, in the history of philosophy, an

anthropocentric bias is perhaps most clearly evident in the dogma of
Western Christianity, which asserts man's transcendence of and rightful
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mastery over nature.

Although man is meant to serve God; human impor

tance relative to the rest of creation is distinctly reflected in man's
monopoly of everlasting life, as well as in the story of creation
inherited from Judaism.

As White (1969, p. 347) noted,

Man named all the animals, thus establishing his dominance over
them. God planned all of this explicitly for man's benefit and
rule: no item in the physical creation had any purpose save to
serve man's purposes. And, although man's body is made of clay,
he is not simply a part of nature; he is made in God's image.
Especially in its Western form, Christianity is the most
anthropocentric religion the world has ever seen. . . . Man
shares in great measure, God's transcendence of nature.
Christianity, in absolute contrast to ancient paganism and
Asia's religions (except, perhaps, Zoroastrianism), not only
established a dualism of man and nature but also insisted that
it is God's will that man exploit nature for his proper ends.
White added that the elimination, by Christianity, of paganism effec
tively eradicated the spirits in objects which had protected nature,
thus providing man with a monopoly on spirit in the natural world, and
minimizing old inhibitions to the exploitation of nature.
Despite the relative decline of its theocentric underpinnings,
the anthropocentrism of Western Christianity appears to have survived
and flourished, and according to White, has contributed substantially
to our present ecological crisis. It is no minor coincidence that modern
science and technology, which have afforded man quantum leaps in his
ability to control the environment, and the anthropocentric religious
view which sanctions such control, are both primarily Occidental in
origin and development.

Note should be taken, however, of a major ex

ception to the rule of Christian anthropocentrism, the St. Francis
tradition.

As White notes, St. Francis laid great emphasis on the

virtue of humility, for man as a species as well as an individual, and
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exemplified a radically equalitarian stance regarding man and other
creatures.

In the context of man's relation with nature, however, St.

Francis is clearly an exception within Western Christianity, which must
be viewed as one of the major contributors in the historical growth of
anthropocentrism.
Turning from theology to astronomy, a rather striking illustration
of anthropocentrism is to be found in the geocentric model of the
universe.

The fact that the notion of the entire universe revolving

around a stationary earth was not fully discredited until the introduc
tion of Kepler's theories in the early 17th century seems attributable
to two main factors.

The first determinant appears to be the prolonged

acceptance of the Pythagorian assumption that celestial bodies move in
uniform circular motions.

As Kopal (1970, p. 33) has pointed out, in

the absence of Kepler's theory of elliptical planetary orbits, " . . .
the heliocentric system--although geometrically simpler--could not
represent the observed motions of celestial bodies really any better
than the earlier geocentric one . . . "

If the geocentric and heliocen

tric models were equally poor in their ability to account for the
mechanics of celestial movement, one might reasonably ask why the geo
centric position so fully predominated pre-Copernican thought.

Why did

the heliocentric theory of Aristarchos in the 3rd century B.C. receive
so little acceptance, and why did the Copernican reintroduction of
heliocentrism in the 16th century precipitate such a storm of protest?
First of all, geocentrism is consistent with the outward appearances of
the sun and other stars revolving about a seemingly motionless earth.
However, the hesitancy to question this common sense proposition, given

17

the availability of the equally plausible heliocentric cosmology, seems
attributable to the anthropocentrism which was evident as an underlying
current in the Stoic philosophy of Aristarchos' era as well as in the
Christian philosophy which dominated the 16th century.
Thus, the geocentric conception of the universe seems to have
been fueled by, and in turn reinforced an anthropocentric world view.
This cosmological support of anthropocentrism has largely crumbled under
the impact of Keplerian evidence confirming the heliocentric model as
well as more recent advances in the field of astronomy.

Our sun is now

believed to be just one of some hundred billion stars in the Milky Way
system, which is but one of some billion visible galaxies in an expanding
universe of yet undetermined dimensions.

The implications of such

findings for our view of man's significance are potentially quite
humbling.

Nevertheless, the anthropocentric individual can still mar

shall cosmological support for his belief system by pointing to the
commonly accepted notion that our earth is the only harbor of life in
the universe.

As indicated by results of the Chandler study

dis

cussed above, anthropocentric individuals do tend to dismiss the possi
bility of extraterrestial life, particularly the likelihood of advanced
life forms.

Any discovery of such life would likely surpass even

Darwin's theory of evolution in its impact upon the collective human
self-image.
The introduction of Darwinian evolutionary theory dealt perhaps
the major blow thus far to the rational foundation of anthropocentrism.
By positing an evolutionary link between man and "lower" forms of life,
Darwin effectively bridged the chasm of dissimilarity which had
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previously separated man from other life forms.

Man's uniqueness was

now susceptible to a more quantitative interpretation, where only quali
tative distinctions between man and animal had received previous popular
accreditation.

As LaBarre (1954) has observed, these implications of

evolutionary theory were not readily assimilated into the Western view
of man.
It is interesting that traditional Christian culture should have
been so much exercized to discover differences between man and
animals. These differences are by no means so evident to (or
sought for by) a majority of peoples of non-European origin.
Most non-Europeans in their philosophy and folklore have easily
assumed a kinship of man with other animals--which Darwinian
evolution has been able to demonstrate to Europeans only against
their strongest emotional and institutional resistances
(LaBarre, 1954, pp. 293-294).
The recognition of this relatedness between man and animal has still not
been fully integrated into our view of ourselves, as indicated by the
enduring strength of Western dualism between man and nature.

Indeed,

Sheppard (1969) maintained that the ultimate task of the human mind will
be "affirmation of its own organic existence," and called for
. . . exploration and openness across an inner boundary— an ego
boundary--and appreciative understanding of the animal in our
selves which our heritage of Platonism, Christian morbidity,
duality, and mechanism have long held repellent and degrading.
The older counter currents— relics of pagan myth, the universal
application of Christian compassion, philosophical naturalism,
nature romanticism and pantheism— have been swept away, leaving
only odd bits of wreckage (p. 3).
Despite ongoing resistance, however, the cumulative impact of Darwinian
evolutionary theory has been to dramatically accentuate similarities
between man and other elements of nature, and to seriously question the
appropriateness of man's heretofore grandiosity.
By the time Darwin introduced his evolutionary theory, another
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development with massive implications had reached full force.

By the

late 18th and early 19th centuries the Baconian creed, maintaining that
scientific knowledge should be applied to bring about technological
power over nature, had been put into effect on a widespread scale.

Tech

nological applications of science had progressed to the point where
anthropocentric attitudes could be translated into industrial harnessing
of nature as a basic policy of western civilization.

The exponential

growth of man's control over the environment since the late 18th century
has been accompanied by increasingly impactful consequences. Whereas
positive consequences have previously been emphasized, increasing aware
ness of potentially self-destructive consequences has led, within this
century, to the growth of ecological consciousness as a counterforce to
the more traditional anthropocentric ideology.
This is "not to say that nonanthropocentric ecological attitudes
are a distinctly 20th century phenomenon.

George Marsh's publication

of Man and Nature in 1867, presenting an exhaustive technical account of
how man, to his own detriment, has disrupted the balance of nature has
been termed the fountainhead of the'conservation movement.

Moreover as

Sheppard <1969) pointed out, such ecological attitudes have
. . . been embodied in widely scattered economically different
cultures. It is manifest, for example, among pre-Classical
Greeks, in Navajo religion and social orientation, in Romantic
poetry of the 18th and 19th centuries, in Chinese landscape
painting of the 11th century, in current Whiteheadian philosophy,
in Zen Buddhism, in the world view of the cult of the Cretan
Great Mother, in the ceremonials of Bushman hunters, and in the
Christian metaphysics of light. What is common among all of
them is a deep sense of engagement with the landscape, with
profound connections to surroundings and to natural processes
central to life (p. 5).
Thus the current resurgence of ecological thinking can be viewed as a
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reawakening of views evident in past centuries, particularly in the
Eastern hemisphere, as well as a reaction to the fallout of the indus
trial age.

Other developments in recent centuries have contributed to

the relative erosion of anthropocentric attitudes.

Post-Darwinian

application of systems theory to environmental analyses (e.g., the con
cept of "ecosystem") has supported notions regarding the interrelated
ness of elements of nature at the expense of anthropocentric dualism.
The relative decline of religion in recent centuries has undercut the
theocentric underpinnings of anthropocentrism, thereby further eroding
support for this position.

This is certainly not to say that an anthro

pocentric approach to man's position and role in nature is in its death
throes.

There appear to be a number of sources of motivational support

for anthropocentrism (to be discussed herein) which are not likely to
disappear, and anthropocentrism appears to be a very marketable
commodity within the business world.

Certainly the strongest contribu

tor to man's continuing self-serving control of nature is the tremendous
reinforcing value of past successes at such control.

Although recent

awareness of negative consequences of man's control has led to a re
examination of this control, behavioral respect for the environment in
the future seems likely to be anthropocentric in motivation.

That is,

respect for the environment is likely to flow not from some new found
respect for the inherent value of nature, but rather from the extent to
which man perceives his own fate to be anchored in the environmental
status quo (i.e., the extent to which environmentalists can successfully
appeal to anthropocentric values).

While anthropocentrism is likely to

continue in coming centuries, it nonetheless does appear that the
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prevailing consensus view of man's place in nature involves consider
ably more humility than the view which dominated Western thought a halfmillenium ago.
Attention is now returned to an examination of the requirements
for the accumulation of construct validation of "anthropocentrism," and
for validation of an operational measure of this trait:
pocentism Scale.

the Anthro-

Ideally, the validation of a given construct, and

the validation of a method for measuring the construct, can to some
extent be dealt with as separate issues, both conceptually and empiri
cally.

In discussing their multitrait-multimethod matrix, Campbell and

Fiske (1959) specified the circumstances in which these two validation
issues can be disentangled.

By using the same type of method to measure

more than one trait, and by measuring each trait by different methods,
the relative contributions of trait and method variance can be separately
evaluated.

Because there is only one available measure of anthropocen

trism, however, the multimethod approach of Campbell and Fiske could not
be brought to bear on the validation issues at hand.

Thus, to a greater

extent than might otherwise have been desired, this study investigated
the validity of a construet-operation unit.

Given the absence of

alternate methods of measurement of anthropocentrism, any defects in the
Anthropocentrism Scale would have a magnified negative effect on attempts
to secure validity for the construct "anthropocentrism."

Accordingly it

is important to review the development and standardization of the
Anthropocentrism Scale to determine the extent to which it is a valid
measure unconfounded by response sets and other method specific variance.
First of all, the test-retest reliability (with a two-week
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interval between administrations) of an earlier form of the Anthro
pocentrism Scale, from which only two items were dropped in the final
form, was .913.

Although this figure is probably a slight overestimate

of the reliability of the final form (given the elimination of two
items), it is clearly within acceptable limits.

Regarding method

specific'variance due to response sets, Anthropocentrism Scale scores
were found to be minimally correlated with a measure of test taking
defensiveness, the K-scale of the M.M.P.I. (r » +.149, p (.05).

Inter

estingly, Kameron (1975) found that his scale tapping man-over-, under-,
and with-nature orientations was only minimally influenced by social
desirability response set, as measured by the Social Desirability Scale
(Crowne and Marlowe, 1964).

Although the correlations found in the

Chandler (Note 1) and Kameron (1975) studies were minimal in size, their
significance suggested that it may be helpful to explore further the
operation of social desirability response set in Anthropocentrism
Scale responses, perhaps by utilizing the Crowne-Marlowe scale.

This

scale is a more direct method of tapping social desirability than the
M.M.P.I. K-Scale, and has the added benefit of having been employed in
the Kameron study.

Other response sets to be controlled include

acquiescence and negative response biases. These response sets were
largely controlled for by wording initial Anthropocentrism Scale items
in both positive and negative directions, in roughly equal proportions.
Seventeen of the thirty final form items are negatively phrased, thereby
minimizing, though not completely eliminating confounding from such
response sets.
Attention is now focused on the initial selection of items, and

the extent to which they adequately represent the construct they are
intended to measure.
item analysis.

Two related questions are raised in regard to this

First, to what extent are the items representative o£

the entire universe of anthropocentric values, attitudes, behaviors, and
beliefs?

Second, should a measure of this universe rely primarily upon

abstract general items which tap wide ranging values affecting a variety
of specific attitudes, or should specific concrete behavioral and attitudinal examples of anthropocentrism be the primary target of study,
even though these may reflect substantial variance from sources other
than anthropocentric values?

Turning first to the question of content

validity, or representativeness of items in sampling the universe of
manifestations of anthropocentrism, it is clear that this universe it
self is not yet clearly defined.

The content validity of "anthropo

centrism" is only minimally established at this time, leaving identi
fication of the manifestations of anthropocentrism to future studies.
An attempt was made in the 1978 Chandler study to sample a wide
variety of items, but the resulting 35 items initially generated were
probably not numerous or heterogeneous enough to sample adequately the
unknown universe of manifestations of anthropocentrism.
The unknown dimensions of this universe raise the second question:
to what extent should error in sampling this unknown universe be reduced
by employing abstract items which do not refer to highly specific con
tent areas.

On one hand, a highly abstract, indirect test could be

used, based on items which state abstract generalizations or values
likely to affect a variety of more specific concrete attitudes. Examples
of such items are item #6:

"Man is the most important species on earth,"
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and #30:

"The primary value of an animal or plant lies in its ability

to serve human needs."

On the other hand, a more direct, concrete,

heterogeneous test could be developed tapping a wide variety of specific
attitudes, each of which supposedly reflects the core anthropocentric
value explicitly stated in the above items.

Such a direct test has the

advantage of greater breadth, and examines attitudinal claims about
real world behavior which is subject to direct observation.

Thus, for

instance, the behavioral validity (consistency between professed atti
tude and actual behavior) of item #5 ("It is wrong to pick flowers for
their beauty value because in so doing we destroy the life of the
flower") is easier to determine than the behavioral validity of more
abstract items such as #6 and #30 discussed above.

However, the use

of such specific items also introduces a good deal of contentspecific variance.

That is, response to an item regarding picking of

flowers taps a variety of issues relevant to one's attitude toward
flowers, but irrelevant to one's values regarding the relation of man
and nature.

Such content-specific variance is probably harmless if

the content itself is representatively sampled from the universe of con
tent, that is, if the test has content validity.

However, since the

empirical investigation of anthropocentrism is just beginning, this
universe is largely unknown, and content validity cannot be clearly es
tablished.

Thus, it is possible that excessive content-specific

variance has been built into the Anthropocentrism Scale.
Factor analysis is one tool which could shed some light on the
extent to which.construct vs. content-specific variance is measured by
the Anthropocentrism Scale.

Would anthropocentrism show up as a broad
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major factor (with high loadings on abstract value based items), and/or
would a variety of content specific factors (e.g., an "attitudes toward
extraterrestial life" factor) appear?

One purpose of this study was

to conduct a factor analysis to determine whether excessive content
specific variance has been built into the Anthropocentrism Scale.

It

may be that a "pure^ anthropocentrism" factor, loading highly on
abstract value items such as #6 and #30, can be derived.

Such a factor

would complement the more content-specific, heterogeneously based total
score on the Anthropocentrism Scale.

In any event, such a factorial

study would help assess the extent of content specific variance on the
Anthropocentrism Scale, and thereby add to the available data regarding
the adequacy of this scale as a measure of the construct "anthropo
centrism."
Such a factor analysis would also provide data on the construct
validity of anthropocentrism, an issue which will now be examined in
detail.

A factor analytic study would contribute an analysis of data

relevant to construct validity by determining whether a broad, unitary
"anthropocentrism" factor does indeed account for a major portion of
the variance on the Anthropocentrism Scale.

An alternate possibility

is that a number of factors of less breadth (broader than factors
loading only on specific content items, but less broad than a unitary
all-encompassing factor) would appear.

Such factors might appear

either in the absence of, or in addition to, an anthropocentrism factor
(a factor on which abstract value laden items such as #6 , #29, and #30
would be required to load highly).

Regardless of outcome, such an

analysis would provide helpful information regarding the breadth and
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facets of the construct anthropocentrism.

Furthermore, it would be

possible to relate these factors (as well as total score on the Anthro
pocentrism Scale) to other variables measured in the course of this
study, thereby further clarifying the nature of the construct "anthro
pocentrism" and any constituent factors.
What other methods might be employed to investigate the nature
of the construct anthropocentrism?

Cronbach and Meehl (1955) have sug

gested the development of a "noraological net," that is, a network of
testable hypotheses relating the construct at hand to other constructs
and observables.

Convergent validity is examined by determining whether

significant correlations do indeed emerge between the construct and
other variables with which it is supposed to be related, while dis
criminant validity is established by proving that supposedly irrelevant
factors do not contribute significantly to the construct in question
(Campbell and Fiske, 1959).

The remainder of this section will be

devoted to the development of a nomological net for the construct
"anthropocentrism."

As Cronbach and Meehl (1955) note, such a network

is limited in scope during the early investigation of a construct, but
"As research proceeds, the construct sends out roots in many directions,
which attach it to more and more facts or other constructs" (p. 291).
The network developed in the following pages is intended to provide the
initial spurt in the growth of this root system.
In developing such a network, it is important that the construct
"anthropocentrism" be related both to other hypothetical constructs and
to overt behaviors.

In regard to behavioral correlates, it should be

noted that anthropocentrism is a hypothetical construct created to
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describe the consistency between a variety of responses, none of which,
in itself, serves as a direct measure of the construct.

Given the

absence of such direct criterion measures, the need to assess construct
validity is imperative (APA, 1966).

Avenues for the collection of

criterion-related validity are also apparent, however.

Even though no

particular overt behavior stands alone as a satisfactory behavioral
measure of anthropocentrism, a variety of behaviors have been postu
lated as manifestations of an anthropocentric value.

Given the sub

stantial research indicating the tenuousness of relationships between
verbally expressed attitudes and overt behavior (Liska, 1975), the need
to relate verbally expressed anthropocentrism to these behavioral mani
festations is apparent.

Accordingly, one focus of this research study

has been to develop a list of behaviors which might be expected on the
part of highly anthropocentric or highly nonanthropocentric individuals.
By asking research participants whether they do indeed display such
behaviors, the degree of concordance between anthropocentric attitudes
and various behaviors hypothesized to depend upon such attitudes can be
determined.

Such data would indicate the extent to which verbally

expressed anthropocentric attitudes are translated into behavior.

This

approach assumes, of course, that respondents are accurate in describing
their own behaviors.

Given this assumption, the resulting data would

help address the question of the "behavioral validity" of the Anthro
pocentrism Scale, and of the construct "anthropocentrism."
A number of hypotheses can be developed regarding the relation of
anthropocentrism to various hypothetical constructs as well.

The con

structs which were empirically explored in relation to anthropocentrism
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in this study included Kameron's (1975) man-over-, under-, or withnature, as well as locus of control, egocentrism/narcissism,
ethnocentrism, and attitudes regarding human nature.
is

examined in detail below.

Each of these

Looking first at Kameron's research,

four factors are relevant to the construct validity of anthropocentrism.
To begin with, anthropocentrism should correlate positively with Factor
1 "conservationist-e x p l o i t a t i o n i s t It seems likely that highly
anthropocentric persons would reject the man-with-nature items that
comprise this factor, and thereby adopt an exploitationist stance,
while persons scoring low in anthropocentrism seem likely to accept
man-with-nature items.

A significant positive correlation would also

be expected between anthropocentrism and Factor 4, "anti-technologypro-technology.11 It seems quite likely that highly anthropocentric
individuals would endorse technological progress, while relatively nonanthropocentric individuals would be more likely to reject the man-overnature items which predominately contribute to this factor.

The

potential relations between anthropocentrism and Kameron's factors 2
and 3 are less predictable, but would be helpful in illuminating the

1-Given the method of obtaining factor scores by multiplying item
score times factor loading for that item, the use of factor loadings
provided by Kameron results in high factor scores for persons adopting
the position described in the latter half of each bipolar factor label
(e.g., conservationist vs. exploitationist; high scores on this first
factor are exploiters). Kameron apparently reflects (multiplies by
-1) his factor scores, since the labels he assigns to high and low
scorers (1975, p. 93) are directly opposite to the labels which would be
assigned if the factor scores were not reflected. In deriving Kameron
factor scores in the study at hand, factor scores were not reflected;
thus, low scorers can be identified by the first term in the label, and
high scorers can be identified by the underlined second term of the
factor label.

29

meaning of low scores on the Anthropocentrism Scale.

Factor 2 (non man-

under-nature vs. man-under-nature and hostile toward animals^ involves
rejection vs. acceptance of man-under-nature items, whereas Factor 3
(non fear of outdoors v s . fear of outdoors^ involves agreement with manwith-nature items versus agreement with man-under-nature items.

It

would thus be instructive to note whether nonanthropocentric persons
tend primarily to adopt a man-with-nature position (low scores on
factors 1 and 3), a man-under-nature position (high scores on factor 2
and 3), or both (low scores on factor 1, high scores on factor 2, mixed
scores on factor 3).
In discussing the man-nature value orientations, Kameron noted
that selection of a particular orientation seems dependent mainly on
one's perception of locus of control vis-a-vis nature.

Thus, man-

under-nature types appear to adopt a rather fatalistic external locus
of control positing the uncontrollable nature of the environment.

Man-

over-nature types appear to believe that nature can and should be con
trolled, thereby endorsing an internal locus of control in man's
dealings with nature.

For man-with-nature types, a more reciprocal

notion of the mutual influence of man and nature appears to be held.
Although Kameron did not empirically measure internal-external locus of
control, it might be expected that both a man-over-nature orientation
and an anthropocentric stance would be associated with an internal locus
of control.

An internal locus of control involves belief that events

and reinforcements are contingent upon one's behavior and characteris
tic rather than on chance or external factors (Rotter, 1966).

As Joe

(1971) noted in his review of research on the internal-external control
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construct, "Although there Is some negative evidence, It appears safe
to conclude that Internals, In contrast to externals, would show a
greater tendency to seek Information and adopt behavior patterns which
facilitate personal control over their environments."

Although items

on Rotter's scale refer primarily to general personal control over one's
fate, as well as social and political control, it seems likely that
beliefs regarding the possibility and advisability of control over the
natural environment would be associated with perception of locus of
control in these other domains.

Thus, anthropocentric individuals would

be expected to maintain an internal locus of control.
a nonanthropocentric stance seem

Persons adopting

more likely to perceive man-nature

relations as a matter of reciprocal influence and control (internal
and external factors interact in determining one's fate; man should
work with nature in determining environmental consequences), or from an
external locus of control (external factors determine one's fate;
nature determines man's fate).

It thus seems likely that a significant

negative correlation would be found between internal-external locus of
control (low scores indicating an internal locus) and anthropocentrism.
It also seems likely that man-nature value orientations would be ordered,
in terms of increasing external locus of control, in the following
manner:

man-over-nature, man-with-nature, man-under nature.
Yet another construct which can be theoretically related to

anthropocentrism is "egocentrism."

If egocentrism is defined in terms

of self-absorption (preoccupation with oneself, coupled with relative
inattention to the external environment), selfishness (emphasis on the
satisfaction of one's own needs at the expense of other's needs), and
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self-aggrandizement (grandiose overevaluation of self), the parallels
between this concept and anthropocentrism are apparent. Anthropocen
trism involves a preoccupation with one's own species coupled with rela
tive inattention to other species; emphasis on the satisfaction of man's
needs at the expense of the needs of other species; and a view of man
as an exalted preeminent being relative.to other species.

Thus, to the

extent that attitudes toward oneself are reflected in corresponding
attitudes toward one's ego-extensions and ingroups (the groups which an
individual belongs to and identifies with, whether they be ethnic,
religious, national, familial, or in the case of anthropocentrism,
one's species), persons who adopt a relatively egocentric stance might
also be expected to be anthropocentric in outlook.

That is, individuals

who take a self-centered approach to interpersonal relations might be
expected to extend their self-centered outlook to ingroup— outgroup
relations, and thereby take a man-centered approach to interspecies
relations.

On these grounds, a positive correlation between the con

structs anthropocentrism and egocentrism (as defined herein) might be
expected.
Difficulties arise, however,when attempting to explore the rela
tion of these two constructs empirically.

The primary empirical usage of

the construct "egocentrism" has been within the Piagetian cognitivedevelopmental framework.

Within this framework, egocentrism has been

defined rather narrowly, emphasizing cognitive skills.

For example,

Looft (1972, p. 74) notes that within cognitive developmental psy
chology, egocentrism "does not pertain to selfishness or an overly keen
regard of oneself, or even to the frequent use of 'I' and 'me.'

The
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essential meaning of egocentrism is an embeddedness in one's own point
of view."

Looft*s definition explicitly excluded two facets of the

concept of egocentrism employed herein:
aggrandizement.

selfishness and self-

The core meaning of his definition, "embeddedness in

one's own point of view," is related but not identical to the third
facet:

self-preoccupation.

Similarly, Ford (1979, pp. 1170-1171)

concluded that the varying current definitions of egocentrism " . . .
share a common core of meaning:

Each refers to an individual's

failure to perceive a situation or an event in more than one way.
This one way of perceiving is the one that is easiest for the indi
vidual, that is, the one that requires no conceptual elaboration
beyond what is directly perceived."

The cognitive emphasis of this

definition, and of the cognitive-developmental measures of egocentrism
based on such definitions, is apparent.

This emphasis on cognitive

factors probably contributes to the tendency of egocentrism "perspec
tive taking" tasks to be confounded with intelligence, spatial and
perceptual skills, and other cognitive factors (Ford, 1979).

Further

more, because the cognitive deficits which theoretically underlie
egocentrism are assumed to disappear with the appearance of formal
operations in adolescence, the concept of egocentrism is not considered
relevant to adulthood (Looft, 1972).

Consequently, the cognitive-

developmental measures of egocentrism are largely restricted to mea
surement of childhood egocentrism.
Because of the somewhat narrow, cognitively based, age-restricted
nature of the cognitive-developmental concept of egocentrism, measures
of egocentrism based on this concept are at best tangential to the
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concerns of this study.

A related construct which is perhaps more

relevant to the concept of egocentrism used herein is the psychoanaly
tic concept of "narcissism."

Although this term has various meanings

within psychoanalytic theory, the glossary of the American Psycho
analytical Association defines narcissism as "A concentration of
psychological interest upon

the self" (Moore and Fine, 1967, p. 57).

Similarily, Kernberg

(1976, p. 115) reserves the term narcissism to

represent " . . .

normal and pathologicalvicissitudes of the

the

libidinal investment

of the self," and describes the conditions leading

to the development of pathological narcissism.

The pathological

variant of narcissism involves heightened grandiosity and yearning for
lost omnipotence as a central feature— the "grandiose self" in Kohut's
(1971) terms.

The reader is referred to Grunberger (1979) for an

in-depth review of narcissism as an analytic concept.

The main point

to be made here is that this concept of narcissism does have sig
nificant overlap with the concept of egocentrism used herein.

Notions

of self-preoccupation and self-aggrandizement are apparent in the
features of narcissism described above, and the notion of selfish con
centration on one's own needs is inherent in the term "narcissistic
sense of entitlement."
Although these aspects of narcissism serve to define the meaning
of the term "egocentrism" used herein, analytic literature has been
less helpful when it comes to measurement.

Analytic identification of

narcissism has usually been based upon analysts' judgements, a method
well beyond the scope of the research methodology considered herein.
However, a technique developed by Exner (1973), grounded in the concepts
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of narcissism and egocentrism, appears to be relevant to a portion of
the concept of egocentrism relied upon herein.

Termed the Self Focus

Sentence Completion, this measure results in an "egocentric balance"
score involving the difference between the number of self-focused vs.
external-world focused completions of sentence stems.

Available

validity data reported by Exner support this technique as a measure of
concern with oneself versus concern with the external world.

Thus,

it does appear possible to measure the relation between anthropocen
trism and egocentrism, given a definition of egocentrism as "pre
occupation with oneself and one's own needs."
Of the three facets of egocentrism emphasized above, only selfaggrandizement is excluded from this measurement approach.

The relation

between such self-aggrandizement and anthropocentrism has already been
empirically explored (Chandler, Note 1) . That study hypothesized that
defensively elevated self-esteem (as indicated by high conscious self
esteem coupled with high defensiveness) would be associated with a
highly anthropocentric outlook, with realistically high self-esteem and
inadequately defended low self-esteem being associated with moderate
and low anthropocentrism, respectively.

However, the predicted differ

ences in anthropocentrism did not reach significance in the small sample
evaluated, and correlations between anthropocentrism and both self
esteem (r ** +.065, not significant) and defensiveness (r = +.149,
2, (.05) were minimal.

While further exploration of the relation between

defensiveness and anthropocentrism may prove fruitful, the Chandler
study indicated that self-aggrandizement, as reflected in defensively
elevated conscious self-esteem, is unrelated to the exaltation of one's

35

species inherent in anthropocentrism.

By employing Exner's scale as an

indicator of "preoccupation with oneself and one's own needs," it would
be possible to investigate the relation of anthropocentrism to the
other facets of egocentrism as defined herein— self-preoccupation/
selfishness.

It is hypothesized that concern with oneself would be

associated with an anthropocentric outlook, whereas concern with the
external world would be associated with a nonanthropocentric stance.
This issue of the relatedness of egocentrism and anthropocen
trism gives rise to the question of whether all types of "centric"
thinking tend to be associated.

One heavily researched area of

"centric" attitudes involves the construct "ethnocentrism," first
defined by Sumner (1907, p. 13) as a "view of things in which one's
own group is the center of everything, and all others are scaled and
rated with reference to it."

More recently, LeVine and Campbell (1972,

p. 1) have noted,
Ethnocentrism has become a familiar word most generally
understood, in parallel with 'egocentrism,' as an attitude or
outlook in which values derived from one's own cultural back
ground are applied to other cultural contexts where different
values are operative. In the most naive form of ethnocen
trism . . . a person unreflexively takes his own culture's
values as objective reality and automatically uses them as
the context within which he judges less familiar objects and
events. As in Piaget's stage of egocentric thought, it does
not occur to such a person that there is more than one point
of view. At a more complex level is the ethnocentric atti
tude or outlook that takes account of multiple points of
view but regards those of other cultures as incorrect,
inferior, or immoral.
If the word "species" were substituted for the word "cultures" in this
definition, the parallels between ethnocentrism and anthropocentrism
become clear.

Both involve the use of a set of narrow self-serving

values in judging various groups, resulting in a highly positive valuing
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of one's own group (culture or species) coupled with a prejudiced de
valuation of outsiders (other cultures and species).

On this basis, a

positive correlation between anthropocentrism and ethnocentrism might
be expected.
However, Adorno et al. (1950) have addressed this issue and have
come to an opposite conclusion, maintaining that ethnocentrism and an
identification with mankind as a whole are incompatible.

A brief

review of the concepts used by Adorno et al. in describing ethnocen
trism will help illuminate the basis for their reasoning on this issue.
Employing the concepts "ingroup" and "outgroup" originally provided by
Sumner (1906), Adorno et al. view ethnocentrism as an ideological
system pertaining to groups and group relations.

They summarize (p.

148),
A primary characteristic of ethnocentric ideology is the
generality of outgroup rejection. It is as if the ethnocen
tric individual feels threatened by most of the groups to
which he does not have a sense of belonging; if he cannot
identify, he must oppose; if a group is not 'acceptable,1 it
is 'alien.' The ingroup-outgroup distinction thus becomes
the basis for most of his social thinking and people are
categorized primarily according to the groups to which they
belong.
The possible association between ethnocentrism and anthropocentrism
revolves about the issue of whether humanity can be conceptualized as
an ingroup in the mind of the ethnocentric individual.

At one juncture

in their analysis, Adorno et al. explicitly rejected this possibility:
"The ethnocentric 'need for an outgroup' prevents that identification
with humanity as a whole which is found in anti-ethnocentrism" (p. 148).
Seemingly implicit in this statement, however, is the assumption that
"humanity" is the most inclusive of all groups, and thus cannot be
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contrasted with a suitable outgroup.

If one transcends the intraspecies

level of analysis of the Adorno et al. study, it becomes clear that
other species can be distinguished from the human species on an ingroup/
outgroup basis.

Given this expanded notion of ingroup constituency, it

appears that the hypothesis of a positive correlation between ethnocen
trism and anthropocentrism is actually an extension rather than a
negation of the findings reported by Adorno et al.

In this regard, the

following statement is particularly relevant.
Another general
shifting of the
tion. Once the
enthnocentrists
tion (Adorno et

characteristic of ethnocentric ideology is the
outgroup among various levels of social organiza
social context for discussion has been set,
are likely to find an outgroup-ingroup distinc
al., 1950, p. 147).

If the context of discussion centers upon the importance and rights of
humans versus those of members of other species, it seems likely that
the enthnocentrist would readily espouse an identification with humanityI
On this basis, a positive correlation between anthropocentrism and
ethnocentrism is hypothesized.
Finally, it is necessary to distinguish attitudes regarding man's
stature and role in nature from other attitudes toward humanity.
Wrightsman (1964) constructed a Philosophies of Human Nature (PHN)
Scale involving six subscales.

Four of these subscales contribute to a

summary score labelled Positive vs. Negative, indicating one's general
evaluative orientation toward human nature.

Unlike the Anthropocentrism

Scale, the PHN Scale was not specifically designed to tap conceptions
of man's stature and role vis-a-vis the rest of nature.

It seems quite

possible that some individuals who view human nature in a generally
negative light (e.g., as manifested in PHN Scale responses), would, if
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provided with a suitable outgroup (i.e., the nonhuman environment),
strongly identify with and favorably evaluate humanity.

Likewise, a

positive view of human nature does not necessarily require anthropo
centrism as a logical derivative; it may alternatively be but one facet
of an omnicentric view, in which the entire environment is positively
valued.

It is important to note that the Anthropocentrism Scale

does not attempt to assess evaluative attitudes toward mankind per
se. Rather, the scale seeks to assess the relative value assigned to
humanity in relation to the value assigned to the nonhuman natural
environment.

Given this distinction, the relationship between the

Anthropocentrism Scale and Wrightsman's PHN Scale requires empirical
investigation to determine if they do indeed measure separate con
structs.

Requirements of discriminant validity would call for a small

correlation (if significant at all) between these two variables,
regardless of the direction of this correlation.
In summary, a nomological net has been constructed for anthropo
centrism involving hypotheses regarding the relations between this con
struct and various other constructs and behavioral referents.

Empirical

testing of these hypotheses is relevant to the construct validity of
anthropocentrism, and the validity of the Anthropocentrism Scale as a
measure of this construct. For those constructs which would be ex
pected to converge with anthropocentrism, significant low to moderate
correlations with anthropocentrism would be expected.

For those con

structs which anthropocentrism is supposedly unrelated to, insignificant
correlations would be expected.
follows.

Accordingly, the hypotheses were as
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1.

The extraction of a broad homogeneous "anthropocentrism'1 factor was

expected from a factor analysis of the Anthropocentrism Scale.
2.

An insignificant correlation between anthropocentrism and social

desirability set was hypothesized.
3.

A significant positive correlation was hypothesized between anthro

pocentric attitudes (as measured by the Anthropocentrism Scale) and
various behaviors thought to be reflective of an anthropocentric stance,
whereas a significant negative correlation was expected between anthro
pocentric attitudes and nonanthropocentric behavior.
4.

Regarding Kameron's factors, (a) A significant positive correlation

was expected between anthropocentrism and Factor 1 (conservationistexploitationist); (b) A significant positive correlation was hypothesized
between anthropocentrism and Factor 4 (anti-technology-pro-technology);
(c) No hypotheses were advanced regarding the relation between anthro
pocentrism and Factors 2 and 3.

Scores on these factors among persons

scoring low on the Anthropocentrism Scale were, however, considered
likely to clarify the meaning of low Anthropocentrism Scale scores.
5.

Regarding internal-external locus of control, a significant negative

correlation was hypothesized between anthropocentrism and locus of
control (where high scores indicate an external locus).
6 . A significant positive correlation was expected between anthropo
centrism and egocentrism (as defined above).
7.

A significant positive correlation was hypothesized between anthro

pocentrism and ethnocentrism.
8 . An insignificant correlation between anthropocentrism and positivity
of one's philosophy of human nature was hypothesized.

METHOD
Study #1:

Factor Analysis

Subjects
Data previously collected during the initial standardization of
the Anthropocentrism Scale (Chandler, Note 1) was used for the current
factor analysis.

Subjects included 49 Marquette University under

graduate students (13 male, 36 female), and 136 Louisiana State Univer
sity undergraduates (54 male, 82 female).

All subjects were volunteers

from lower level psychology courses, although most of the LSU partici
pants were provided the nominal incentive of two points extra course
credit for their research participation.

Complete confidentiality of

data was promised, and was guaranteed by asking students not to write
their names on the test protocols.
Instrument
The Anthropocentrism Scale (Chandler, Note 1), a 30 item Likert
format scale (see Appendix A ) .
Procedure
The factor analytic procedure initially involved a principal com
ponents analysis, using intercorrelations among the 30 items of the
Anthropocentrism Scale as the initial correlation matrix (total score on
the Anthropocentrism Scale was not included as a 31st variable in this
matrix).

An initial eigenvalue cutoff of 1.0, followed by a Scree test

(Cattell (1966), were then used to determine the number of factors to be
retained.

Subsequently an orthogonal (varimax procedure) and an oblique

(promax procedure) rotation were performed to determine which rotation
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would yield more meaningful, interpretable factors.

Factor scores were

then derived from the data obtained from the varimax rotation.

Of the

various methods for computing factor scores, the following straight
forward procedure was used.

For each item contributing to a given factor,

item score was multiplied by the factor loading of that item on that
factor.

The sum of these products was the factor score of an individual

on that factor.

In order to avoid substantial correlations between

factor scores for various factors, each item was used in the scoring of
only one factor.

Criteria for assignment of a given item to a given

factor were as follows.
For each factor, the item loading highest on that factor was used
in scoring that factor.
Secondly, items were not used in the scoring of any factor unless
a significant (r = .228, given df = 73) factor loading was obtained for
that item on the factor in question.
Thirdly, each item was used in the scoring of whatever factor on
which it loaded highest.

The one exception to this rule was as follows.

An attempt was made to include three items in the scoring of each factor.
An item which loads highest on hypothetical factor Q was to be used
instead in the scoring of hypothetical factor Z, if two criteria were met:
(a) if that item was needed to provide a second or third item for scoring
of factor Z, and (b) if that item was not a major contributor (factor
loading of .50 or above) to factor Q.
Finally, for any uninterpretable factors, items which would have
loaded on that factor were to be used in scoring other factors, subject
to other applicable rules for item assignment.
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Study # 2 :

Construct Correlations

Subjects
Subjects included 37 male and 37 female volunteers enrolled in
an Introductory Psychology course at LSU.

Instruments
1.

The Anthropocentrism Scale (Appendix A) was used as a mea

sure of anthropocentrism, with high total scores indicating a high
level of anthropocentrism, and a low score indicating a relatively
nonanthropocentric individual.
2.

Kameron's (1975) scale (see Appendix C) was used to measure

five separate variables.

This scale is a 126 item scale including 93

man-nature value orientation items, as well as the 33 items of the
Social Desirability Scale (Crowne & Marlowe, 1964), combined in a
random sort.

Scores on the following five variables were obtained

using Kameron's scale:

(a) Factor 1 (conservationist vs. exploits-

tionist). where high scores indicate an exploitationist stance; (b)
Factor 2 (non man-under-nature vs. man-under nature and hostile toward
animals). where high scores indicate a man-under-nature and hostile
toward animals orientation; (c) Factor 3 (non fear of outdoors vs.
fear of outdoors), where high scores indicate fear of outdoors; (d)
Factor 4 (anti-technology vs. pro-technology). where high scores
indicate a pro-technology stance and (e) Social desirability set, with
high scores indicating a strong tendency to give socially desirable
answers.

For an examination of the factor loadings of individual

items on these factors, see Kameron (1975).
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3.

Rotter's (1966) Internal-External Control Scale was used to

measure locus of control (see Appendix D).

High scores on this scale

indicate an external locus of control.
4.

Egocentrism, defined as preoccupation with oneself and

one's own needs, was measured using Exner's (1973) Self Focus Sentence
Completion.

The sentence stems for this task are provided in Appendix

B, while scoring procedures can be located in Exner (1973).

The

scoring procedures yield an "egocentric balance" score, a difference
score requiring subtraction of the number of external world focused
responses from the number of self focused responses.

Positive d

scores thus are indicative of an egocentric stance, whereas negative
scores indicate a tendency to focus on the external world at the
expense of oneself.
5.

The Xenophobia Scale (Campbell & McCandless, 1951) was

employed as a measure of ethnocentrism.

It should be noted that this

measure taps outgroup rejection but does not measure ingroup loyalty
as some measures do (such as the now outdated E-Scale of Adorno et al.).
Items of the Xenophobia Scale were developed in such a way that atti
tudes toward different outgroups can be measured.

Outgroups included

in this study were Whites, Blacks, Mexicans, Iranians, and Jews/
Christians.

Each person was asked to respond to the standard 25 items

(see Appendix F) for each of four outgroups, with his ingroup excluded.
For example, a White Jewish individual would be asked to respond to
items regarding Blacks, Mexicans, Iranians, and Christians, whereas
non-Jews would be asked to respond to Iranians, Jews, and two of the
three racial groups (their own racial group excluded). High scores on
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the Xenophobia Scale indicate a high level of ethnocentrism.
6.

The Favorability score from the PHN Scale (Wrightsman,

1964) was used as a measure of favorability of one's attitudes
toward human nature.

High scores indicate a positive, favorable view

of human nature, whereas low scores indicate an unfavorable view.
See Appendix H for PHN Scale content.
7.

A form requesting a variety of demographic information (see

Appendix I) was also administered, seeking data on the following
variables:

age, sex, major subject area at LSU, race, religious

preference, political ideology (liberal-conservative), political
party preference (Democrat, Republican, Independent), and parent's
socio-economic status.
8 . A list of primarily ecologically related behaviors was also
presented to each subject, with the research participant being asked
whether he does or does not engage in each behavior.

This Environ

mental Behavior List (EBL) included eight items from the Actual
Commitment Subscale of the Ecology Scale (Mahoney et al., 1975), as
well as other items developed as part of this study.

The behavioral

items are presented in Appendix G, accompanied by scoring criteria.
Three scores can be derived from each subject's EBL responses: (a) an
Anthropocentric Behavior Score, based on responses to 11 items describ
ing supposedly anthropocentric behaviors, with high scores indicating
reported involvement in anthropocentric behaviors, (b) a Nonanthropocentric Behavior Score, based on responses to 20 items describing
supposedly nonanthropocentric behaviors, with high scores indicating
reported engagement in nonanthropocentric behaviors, and (c) a total
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EBL score, based on responses to all 31 items, with high scores indi
cating involvement in anthropocentric behaviors but not in nonanthro
pocentric behaviors, while low scores indicate involvement in
nonanthropocentric behaviors but not in anthropocentric behaviors.

Procedure
Volunteers interested in gaining extra credit in their Intro
ductory Psychology course were asked to sign up to take part in an
"attitude survey."

Once assembled, subjects were given a packet

including each of the eight instruments described above.

Subjects

were assured of complete anonymity and were asked not to write their
names on any of the forms. Each instrument in a given packet was
labeled with a specific number, and subjects were asked to write down
their identifying number in order to identify their profile in a later,
optional group feedback session.

All instruments were given to all

volunteers, with the data being collected in October and November of
1980, two to three months prior to the resolution of the AmericanIranian hostage crisis (in which the American embassy in Tehran was
seized by Iranian militants).

Regarding the sequence of administra

tion of instruments, the demographics form appeared first, followed by
the Anthropocentrism Scale, for all subjects.

Similarly, the Xeno

phobia Scale appeared last for all subjects, and the Environmental
Behavior List appeared next to last for all subjects.

The remaining

four instruments were arranged in each of the possible 24 sequences,
with each sequence being repeated at least three times among the 74
subjects.

This sequencing of the eight instruments was designed to

reduce unnecessary biasing of Anthropocentrism Scale responses, to
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reduce biasing caused by familiarity with the relatively face valid
Xenophobia Scale, and to control (via counterbalancing) any order
effects among the four instruments sandwiched between these two scales.
The relationship between Anthropocentrism Scale total score and
each of the major continuous variables (Kameron's factors, locus of
control, egocentrism, ethnocentrism, EBL score, PHN favorability, and
socioeconomic status) was assessed via Pearson product-moment corre
lation coefficients, using .05 as the minimum level of significance.
In addition, an analysis of variance (ANOVA) was conducted comparing
high (top 27%), medium (middle 46%), and low (bottom 27%)anthropocen
trism groups on each of the above variables, with Duncan Multiple
Range Tests used to identify the source of any significant findings.
In the event of a nonsignificant product-moment correlation, such an
ANOVA was considered potentially useful in identifying any curvilinear
trend between anthropocentrism and the dependent variable in question.
Similar product-moment correlations and ANOVAs were obtained for each
of the interpretable factors derived from the Anthropocentrism Scale,
relating each of these factors to each of the continuous variables
listed above.
The relationship between total score on the Anthropocentrism
Scale and each of the categorical variables (sex, race, religion,
political party preference, and political ideology) was assessed using
a separate ANOVA for each of these five independent variables, with
Duncan Multiple Range Tests again used to identify significant differ
ences between groups in the event of a significant F-test.
sets of ANOVAs were conducted for each of the interpretable

Similar
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Anthropocentrism Scale factors, thereby testing the significance of
the relationship between each factor and each categorical variable.
In addition, biserial correlations were obtained to ascertain
the nature of the relationship between Anthropocentrism Scale total
score and each EBL item.

Finally, a stepwise regression analysis was

conducted, using all nonenvironmental continuous variables (ethnocentrism, egocentrism, PHN Favorability, locus of control, and socio
economic status) to predict total score on the Anthropocentrism Scale.
In the same vein, a canonical correlational analysis was to be conducted
as well, relating these same nonenvironmental continuous variables
(predictors) to the factors derived from the Anthropocentrism Scale
(criterion variables).

RESULTS

Study #1;

Factor Analysis

A principal components analysis yielded nine factors (based on
an eigenvalue cutoff value of 1.0 as well as a Scree test) which
account for 58.9% of the total variance on the Anthropocentrism Scale.
Table 1 lists the eigenvalues and variance accounted for by each of
these nine factors, as well as the correlation between factor scores
and total score on the Anthropocentrism Scale.
A comparison of results of the principal components analysis,
an orthogonal (varimax) rotation, and an oblique (promax) rotation
indicates that all three methods produce an easily interpretable first
factor.

Beyond this first factor, however, rotated data is clearly

more meaningful, with the varimax rotation providing slight advantages
over the promax rotation in regard to meaningfulness and interpretability of factors.

Accordingly, all data reported below are those

resulting from the varimax orthogonal rotation.

The factor structure

matrix resulting from this varimax procedure is reproduced in Table 2.
Factor #1, accounting for 19.8% of the variance, is perhaps best
identified as a "pure anthropocentrism vs. nonanthropocentrism" factor.
Reference to Table 1 indicates that this factor correlates .827 with
total score on the Anthropocentrism Scale.

Furthermore, reference to

Table 3 indicates that the five highest loading items on Factor #1 each
contains an abstract value judgement maintaining the superiority or
importance of human life relative to other life forms.

Since this value

judgement has previously been identified as the foundation or sina qua
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Table 1
Eigenvalues, Factor-Test Correlations, and Variance
Accounted for by the Nine Anthropocentrism
Scale Factors

Factor

Eigenvalue

Percent of
Variance
Accounted for
by this Factor

Cumulative
Percent of
Variance
Accounted for

Correlation
Between Factor
Score and
Total Score on
Anthropocen
trism Scale

1

5.94

19.8

19.8

.827a

2

2.16

7.2

27.0

.513a

3

1.91

6.4

33.4

.502a

4

1.57

5.2

38.6

.669a

5

1.36

4.5

43.2

.254d

6

1.28

4.3

47.4

.254d

7

1.21

4.0

51.5

.433a

8

1.13

3.8

55.2

,602a

9

1.09

3.6

58.9

•496a

Significant at the .0001 level
Significant at the .001 level
Significant at the .01 level
Significant at the .05 level
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Table 2
Factor Structure Matrix derived from the
Anthropocentrism Scale3

Anthropo
centrism
Scale
Item
1

Factor
#1

#2

#3

#4

#5

#6

#7

#8

#9

.106

.040

.101

.086

.924

.055

.031

.002

.016

.022

.130

-.102

.003

.062

.016

2

.185

.013

.772

3

.303

.080

-.050

-.032

.032

.058

.073

-.176

.351

4

.500

.068

-.023

-.007

.040

.041

.354

.030

.067

5

.121

.045

-.022

.360

.103

.190

.249

.078

.155

6

.551

-.158

.110

.046

.200

.239

.154

.255

.399

.565

.025

7

.055

.214

-.058

.112

-.017

-.119

-.012

8

-.038

.610

-.076

-.028

.057

-.008

.111

.201

.037

9

.410

.056

.366

.045

.043

.005

-.252

.219

.273

10

.056

.274

.201

.352

.043

.167

.159

.104

.131

11

.182

.278

-.197.

.035

.198

.122

-..265

.070

.126

12

.285

.239

.193

.196

.153

.024

.527

.083

.123

13

.104

.105

-.002

.220

.198

.036

.218

.429

-.054

14

.705

.183

.176

.138

.131

.068

.065

-.054

-.071

-.003

.084

.084

.075

-.098

.035

15

.035

.051

.712

16

.110

.281

.221

.364

.017

.222

.066

.289

.124

17

.484

.002

.027

-.034

-.004

.220

-.086

-.029

-.139

18

.279

.044

.155

.221

.163

.170

.217

.,228

-.038

19

.075

.113

.150

.341

-.031

.059

.101

-.087

.402

20

.154

.062

-.034

.027

.086

.780

.012

-.032

.037

21

.328

.291

.053

.046

.012

.228

-.076

.192

.205

22

.666

-.023

.040

.148

.078

.141

-.001

.035

.138

23

.162

' .087

-.080

.192

.058

-.030

.266

.058

-.057

24
25
26

.119
.247
.254

.025
.008
.572

-.020
-.044
.231

.675
.175
.176

.132
.029
.090

.044
.050
.165

-.009
.038
.044

.180
-.074
-.011

.006
.005
-.065

27
28
29
30

.122
.127
.627
.438

.146
.055

.386
-.020
.132
.236

-.128

-.146
.129
.069
.000

.110
-.066
.001
-.057

.179
.090
.074
.108

-.049
-.072
.046
.051

-.134
.019
-.013
.050

.111
.358

J lL L
.045
.148

aUnderlined factor loadings indicate those items which are retained in
the derivation of factor scores for each factor.
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Table 3
Anthropocentrism Scale Factor #1;
Significant3 Factor Loadings

Item #k

Item Content

Factor
Loading0

#14

Humans are superior to all other animals in
all important respects.

.705

#22

No matter how superiority is defined, it seems
that man must be considered superior to all
known forms of life.

.666

#29

Man is the most significant entity in the
universe.

.627

#06

Man is the most important species on earth.

.551

#04

The human species is without a doubt the most
advanced form of life on earth.

.500

#17

Degree of intelligence ought to be the main
measure for determining the superiority of
one species over another.

.484

#30

The primary value of an animal or plant lies in
its ability to serve human needs.

.438

#09

If we eventually discover life in other parts of
of the universe, such life will probably be
found to be inferior to human life.

.410

#21

Governments should adopt policies which ensure
the survival of the human species, even if
other species become extinct as a result.

.328

Q

Factor loadings above .228 are significant at the .05 level
given df * 73.
^Underlined item numbers indicate items whose scoring is
reversed prior to application of other statistical procedures.
Agreement with these items thus results in a low raw item score.
cLoadings of items used in derivation of factor scores for
Factor #1 are underlined.
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Table 3 (continued)

Item #b_____________________ Item Content_____________________ Loading^
#03

Man should control the environment for his own
benefit as much as possible.

.303

#12

It is best to think of man as just one of many
members of the animal world.

.285

#18

If there actually is an afterlife, animals are
just as likely as humans to take part in such
a life after death.

.279

#26

Many animals and plants are far more advanced
than most people like to believe.

.254

#25

If I could choose my own afterlife, I would like
to be something other than a human being for a
change.

.247

53

non of a truly anthropocentric stance, it is appropriate to label Factor
1 a "pure anthropocentrism vs. nonanthropocentrism" factor.

High

factor scores indicate a relatively anthropocentric stance (in the
labelling of factors, the first of the two bipolar terms will in each
instance refer to the anthropocentric stance).
Factor #2 accounts for 7.2% of the total variance, but is somewhat
less clearcut in its meaning than is Factor #1.

It is apparent, however,

that whereas items loading high on Factor #1 are positively scored and
are focused on man in their content, the two items which load highest on
Factor #2 (see Table 4) are both negatively scored and focus on animals
and plants.

Since the specific focus of these items is on the adapta

tion and level of development of animals and plants, Factor #2 is
labelled "other species poorly adapted vs. well adapted and advanced"
(with high factor scores indicating a belief that other species are
relatively poorly adapted).
Factor #3 accounts for 6.4% of the total variance, and is clearly
a content specific "extraterrestial life unlikely vs. likely" factor.
The two items having high loadings on Factor #3 each explicitely refers
to the likelihood of life beyond earth (see

Table 5).

High factor

scores indicate a belief that extraterrestial life is unlikely.
Factor #4 accounts of 5.2% of the variance.

Items which load

on this factor (see Table 6 ) are each negatively scored, and contain
fairly homogeneous content referring to a concern that death of and
damage to plants and animals be avoided.

Accordingly, Factor #4 is

labelled "low vs. high concern for animals and plants," with high factor
scores indicating low concern.
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Table 4
Anthropocentrism Scale Factor #2:
Significant3 Factor Loadings

Item

Item Content

Factor
Loading0

# 8

Most animals and plants seem to be better
adapted to their environments
than man is to his environment.

.610

#26

Many animals and plants are far more advanced
than most people like to believe.

.572

#30

The primary value of an animal or plant lies
in its ability to serve human needs.

.358

#21

Governments should adopt policies which ensure
the survival of the human species, even if
other species become extinct as a result.

.291

#16

I sometimes feel that the killing of an animal
is just as wrong as the killing of a human
being.

.281

#11

Man is better equipped to survive environmental
disasters than any other species.

.278

#10

Humans should show more respect for the rights
of animals and plants.

.274

#12

It is best to think of man as just one of many
members of the animal world.

.239

aFactor loadings above .228 are significant at the .05 level
given df = 73.
^Underlined item numbers indicate items whose scoring is reversed
prior to application of other statistical procedures. Agreement with
these items thus results in a low raw item score.
°Loadings of items used in the derivation of factor scores for
Factor #2 are underlined.

55

Table 5
Anthropocentrism Scale Factor #3:
Significant3 Factor Loadings

Item

Item Content

Factor
Loading0

#02

It is quite possible that highly advanced
civilizations exist in other parts of the
universe.

.772

#15

It is likely that "flying saucers" are
presently visiting earth.

.712

#27

I usually enjoy science fiction novels and
films.

.386

#09

If we eventually discover life in other parts
of the universe, such life will probably be
found to be inferior to human life.

.366

#30

The primary value of an animal or plant lies
in its ability to serve human needs.

.236

#26

Many animals and plants are far more advanced
than most people like to believe.

.231

aFactor loadings above .228 are significant at the .05 level
given df = 73.
Underlined item numbers indicate items whose scoring is
reversed prior to application of other statistical procedures. Agree
ment with these items thus results in a low raw item score.
cLoadings of items used in the derivation of factor scores for
Factor #3 are underlined.
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Table 6
Anthropocentrism Scale Factor #4:
Significant3 Factor Loadings

Item Content

Item

Factor
Loading3

#24

I occasionally feel that it is morally wrong
to eat meat.

.675

#28

Sometimes my conscience prevents me from
killing bothersome flies and insects.

.617

#16

I sometimes feel that the killing of an animal
is just as wrong as the killing of a human
being.

.364

#05

It is wrong to pick flowers for their beauty
value, because in so doing, we destroy the
life of the flower.

.360

Humans should show more respect for the rights
of animals and plants.

.352

Protecting the environment is more important
than the production of consumer goods.

.341

#10

#19

.

aFactor loadings above .228 are significant at the .05 level
given df = 73.
^Underlined item numbers indicate items whose scoring is reversed
prior to application of other statistical procedures. Agreement with
these items thus results in a low raw item score.
cLoadings of items used in the derivation of factor scores for
Factor #4 are underlined.
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Factor #5 is a singlet whose only significant loading is derived
from item #1, dealing with the similarities and differences between man
and animals.

Since this factor is derived from only one significantly

loading item, and thus does not constitute a true factor, factor scores
are not derived for "factor" #5.

Similarly Factor #6 is a singlet whose

only significant loading is derived from item #20 dealing with prefer
ence for city or country life.

Again, since the scoring of factor #6

would involve little more than a transformation of the data obtained for
this one item, factor scores are not derived for this "factor."
Factor #7 is a doublet accounting for 4.0% of the total variance
on the Anthropocentrism Scale.

The composition of this factor is some

what varied and difficult to interpret if all significantly loading
items are taken into consideration (see Table 7).

However, since

scoring of this factor relies on only two of these items, interpretation
is somewhat easier.

Since high scorers on factor #7 tend to deny that

man is just a member of the animal world, and that the universe would
be better off without humans, this factor is labelled "man unique and
harmless vs. man as destructive animal."

Given the fact that only two

items contribute to this factor, caution is advised in its utilization.
Factor #8 accounts for 3.87* of the total variance and is similar
in content to Factor #4, in that high loading items are each negatively
phrased and reflect concern regarding the death of animals.

Unlike

Factor #4, however, items contributing to Factor #8 generally refer to
situations where human welfare (cure for diseases, avoidance of auto
injury) and the welfare of animals are mutually exclusive options.
Accordingly, Factor #8 is labelled ,!welfare of humans vs. welfare of
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Table 7
Anthropocentrism Scale Factor #7:
Significant3 Factor Loadings

Item #b

Item Content

Factor
Loading3

#12

It is best to think of man as just one of
many members of the animal world.

.527

#04

The human species is without a doubt the most
advanced form of life on earth.

.354

#23

The universe would be much better off if
humans did not exist.

.266

#11

Man is better equipped to survive environmental
disorders than any other species.

-.265

#09

If we eventually discover life in other parts
of the universe, such life will probably be
found to be inferior to human life.

-.252

#05

It is wrong to pick flowers for their beauty
value, because in so doing, we destroy the
life of the flower.

.249

aFactor loadings above .228 are significant at the .05 level
given df = 73.
^Underlined item numbers indicate items whose scoring is reversed
prior to application of other statistical procedures. Agreement with
these items thus results in a low raw item score.
Q

Loadings of items used in the derivation of factor scores for
Factor #7 are underlined.
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Table 8
Anthropocentrism Scale Factor #8:
Significant3 Factor Loadings

Item

Item Content

Factor
Loading3

# 7

It is wrong for scientists to try to find
cures for human diseases by experimentally
producing these diseases in animals.

.565

#13

When driving a car, one should go out of his
way to avoid animals crossing the road, even
at the risk of an accident with another
automobile.

.429

#16

I sometimes feel that the killing of an animal
is just as wrong as the killing of a human
being.

.289

# 6

Han is the most important species on earth.

.255

#18

If there actually is an afterlife, animals are
just as likely as humans to take part in
such a life after death.

.228

aFactor loadings above .228 are significant at the .05 level
given df = 73.
bUnderlined item numbers indicate items whose scoring is reversed
prior to application of other statistical procedures. Agreement with
these items thus results in a low raw item score.
cLoadings of items used in the derivation of factor scores for
Factor #8 are underlined.
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animals," with high factor scores indicating a strong emphasis on the
welfare of humans.
Finally, Factor #9 accounts for 3.6% of the total variance, with
the content of significantly loading items generally referring to the
options of using the environment for man's benefit, or protecting the
environment.

Factor #9 is therefore labelled "exploitation vs.

protection of the environment," with high factor scores indicative of
an exploitationist position.

Again, caution should be used in the use

of factor 9, since it is derived from only two items.
Additional information regarding the meaning of these Anthropo
centrism Scale factors is available in the correlations obtained between
factor scores and other variables during the course of Study #2.

Study #2:

Construct Correlations

Results of correlational analyses relevant to hypotheses two
through nine are presented in Table 10, and are as follows:
Regarding hypothesis #2, no significant relationship was found
between social desirability set and total score on the Anthropocentrism
Scale (r = .159, N.S.).
Regarding hypothesis #3, a significant linear relationship was
found,as predicted, between total score on the Environmental Behavior
List (EBL) and total score on the Anthropocentrism Scale (r = .549,
p <.0001).

Total score on the Anthropocentrism Scale was also signif-

cantly correlated with both the Anthropocentric Behavior Score
(r = .500, p<.0001) and the Nonanthropocentric Behavior Score
(r = -.470, p<.0001) derived from the EBL.

Analysis of biserial corre

lations between total score on the Anthropocentrism Scale and response

61

Table 9
Anthropocentrism Scale Factor #9:
Significant3 Factor Loadings

Item Content

Item

Factor
Loading0

£11

Protecting the environment is more important
than the production of consumer goods.

.402

# 6

Man is the most important species on earth.

.399

# 3

Man should control the environment for his own
benefit as much as possible.

.351

# 9

If we eventually discover life in other parts
of the universe, such life will probably be
found to be inferior to human life.

.273

£

Factor loadings above .228 are significant at the .05 level
given df = 73.
^Underlined item numbers indicate items whose scoring is reversed
prior to application of other statistical procedures. Agreement with
these items thus results in a low raw item score.
cLoadings of items used in the derivation of factor scores for
Factor #9 are underlined.
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Table 10
Product Moment Correlations between Anthropocentrism
and Other Variables

Variable

Correlation with
Total Score on
Anthropocentrism Scale

Social Desirability Set

.159

Environmental Behavior List Total Score

.549a

Anthropocentric Behavior Score from EBL

.500a

Nonanthropocentric Behavior Score from EBL

-.470a

KF1 : Conservationist vs. Exploitationist

.599a

KF2 : Non Man Under Nature vs. Man Under and
Hostile toward Nature

.333°

KF3 : Non Fear of Outdoors v s . Fear of Outdoors

.583a

KF4 : Anti-Technoloev vs. Pro-Technoloev

.430a

Internal-External Locus of Control

.030

Egocentrism

-.073

Ethnocentrism

.358°

PHN Favorability

.092

Socioeconomic Status

.130

Significant at .0001 level
Significant at .001 level
cSignifleant at .01 level
Significant at .05 level
eUnderlined term indicates the meaning of a high score on a
given variable.
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to individual EBL items (see Table 11) indicates that 12 of the 31 EBL
items were significantly correlated with anthropocentrism.

Of the 11

items describing supposedly anthropocentric behavior, 6 were signifi
cantly positively correlated with total score on the Anthropocentrism
Scale, while 6 of the 20 items describing supposedly nonanthropocentric
behavior were significantly negatively correlated with total score on
the Anthropocentrism Scale.
Regarding hypothesis #4, a significant positive correlation was
found between total score on the Anthropocentrism Scale, and score on
each of the four Kameron factors (KFl, KF2, KF3, and KF4).

As pre

dicted, a significant linear relationship was detected between KFl
(Conservationist vs. Exp1oitationist) and anthropocentrism (r = .599,
£ <.0001), indicating that highly anthropocentric individuals tend to
endorse exploitation of the environment.

Likewise, the hypothesis of

a significant positive correlation between KF3 (Anti-technology vs.
Pro-technology) was confirmed (r = .430, £<.0001), indicating that
highly anthropocentric individuals tend to support the growth of
technology.

Although no hypotheses were advanced regarding the other

Kameron factors, results indicate that anthropocentric individuals tend
to endorse the "man under and hostile toward nature" position (anthropocentrism:r:KF2 = .333, £<.01), and tend to be fearful of the outdoors
as well (anthropocentrism:r:KF3 = .583, £<.0001).
Regarding hypothesis #5, results do not support the prediction
that anthropocentric individuals would display an internal locus of
control.

Data reveal an insignificant correlation between internal-

external locus of control and total score on the Anthropocentrism Scale
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Table 11
Biserial Correlations between Total Score on the Anthropocentrism
Scale, and Response to Environmental Behavior List Items

BBL
Item #

1.

Item Content

I keep track of my senators' and con
gressman's voting records on
environmental issues.

Biserial
Correlation
Percent of with Total
Sample Who Score on
Responded Anthropocen"True"
trism Scale

9.5

.079

68.9

.277

I subscribe to one or more ecological
publications.

16.2

- .406°

I can clearly remember having bought a
product specifically because it had a
lower polluting effect.

51.4

- .438b

5 .3 I kill cockroaches when they appear in my
living quarters.

91.9

.147

6 . I go out of my way to buy products in
recyclable containers, despite the
hassle.

13.5

-.113

I have attended at least one meeting
concerned with ecological or environ
mental issues.

40.5

-.359c

I save newspapers for collection during
paper recycling drives.

76.2

-.297

2 ,a I have used, pesticides to protect my
plants when necessary.
3.

4.

7.

8.

Indicates items describe supposedly anthropocentric behaviors,
and which therefore contribute to the Anthropocentric Behavior
Score. All other items describe supposedly non anthropocentric
behavior and contribute to the Nonanthropocentric Behavior Score.
^Significant at the .01 level.
Significant at the .05 level.
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Table 11 (continued)

EBL
Item #
9.

Item Content

Biserial
Correlation
Percent of with Total
Sample Who Score on
Responded Anthropocen
"True"
trism Scale

Because of my beliefs regarding the
effects of overpopulation, I will
limit the size of my family to two
children or less.

68.2

■.108

87.8

.344

28.4

.4221

35.1

.525b

41.9

- .367c

I have attended an anti-nuclear power
meeting.

4.1

-.193d

I have written to a newspaper or legistator
regarding the adverse effects of pollution.

4.1

-.127d

10.a I have used aerosol cans occasionally
during the last few years.
11.

When possible, I prefer to drive a fairly
large car rather than an economy size
car.

12.a When I vote, I'm more likely to support a
candidate who supports growth of the
economy and business, than a candidate
who supports putting controls on business
in order to protect the environment.
13.

14.

15.

I keep my thermostat set at 78 degrees or
above in the summer, and 65 degrees or
below in the winter, in order to con
serve energy and reduce pollution.

16.a I often buy products contained in no deposit/
no return bottles.
74.3
17.

I can clearly remember switching products
for environmental reasons.

50.0

.150

-.101

dSignificance cannot be tested since the percent of "true"
responses does not fall between 5% and 95% (see Guilford & Fruchter,
1973, p. 295).
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Table 11 (continued)

EBL
Item #

18.

19.

20.

Item Content

Percent of
Sample Who
Responded
•'True"

I have at times taken a bus or bicycle
across town, even when I had a car
available to me, in order to reduce
pollution of the environment.

54.1

-,386b

I have been involved in at least one
litter cleanup drive.

70.3

-.217

I have contributed money to an organi
zation whose main task is to protect
the natural environment.

28.4

-.321c

85.1

.388c

2 1 .a If I'm honest with myself, I have to
admit that I sometimes throw small
pieces of litter on the ground, or out
of my car window.
22.

Biserial
Correlation
with Total
Score on
Anthropocen
trism Scale

I have at times boycotted products because
they were made by companies found
guilty of damaging the natural environ
ment.

18.9

-.293

I have used a recycling center for bottles
or cans at least once within the last
year.

16.2

-.250

24.a When I think about it, I realize that I do
little or nothing to protect or improve
the environment.

67.6

-.071

13.5

-.339

23.

25.

I am willing to put a brick in my toilet
in order to reduce its water consump
tion, and I will do so soon.

26.a Even though use of carpools, buses, bikes,
etc. reduce pollution, I prefer the
convenience of a car.
27.

I have reduced my electricity consumption
by 20% or more over the last two years.

58.1

47.3

,390b

-.144
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Table 11 (continued)

EBL
Item #

28.

Item Content

I am very willing to pay, out of my
own earnings, an additional tax of
50 dollars a year, to be used
specifically to improve the natural
environment.

29.3 I don't go out of my way to protect the
environment, since that's the
government's j ob.

Percent of
Sample Who
Responded
"True"

51.4

Biserial
Correlation
with Total
Score on
Anthropocentrism Scale

-.251

18.9

■451b

I can remember a period in my life when
I was a vegetarian because 1 felt it
was morally wrong to eat meat.

2.7

-.347£

31.a I turn on my air conditioner or heater
when the temperature is uncomfortable
to me, regardless of energy consump
tion.

55.4

30.

.324
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(r = .030, N.S.).

Furthermore, an ANOVA examining the locus of control

of high, middle, and low anthropocentrism groups indicates no signifi
cant differences

among

these groups (F ® 0.30, N.S.), thereby ruling

out the possibility of a curvilinear relationship as well.
Hypothesis #6 was also unsupported by the data.

Results indicate

an insignificant correlation between egocentrism and total score on the
Anthropocentrism Scale (r = -.073, N.S.).

Again, an ANOVA used to

explore the possibility of a curvilinear trend between egocentrism and
anthropocentrism showed no significant difference between high, middle,
and low anthropocentrism groups in level of egocentrism (F = 0.19, N.S.).
Thus, results indicate that egocentrism and anthropocentrism are not
related to each other in either a linear or a curvilinear fashion.
Regarding hypothesis #7, a positive correlation was found, as
predicted, between overall ethnocentrism and total score on the Anthropo
centrism Scale (r = .358, £ ^.01).

Table 12 contains a summary of the

relationship between anthropocentrism and ethnocentrism in regard to
each of the six outgroups examined in this study.

As indicated, a sig

nificant direct relationship was established between anthropocentrism
and tendency to reject each of four major outgroups:
cans, Blacks, and Jews.

Iranians, Mexi

Inadequate sampling of Jewish subjects

prevented assessment of the relation between anthropocentrism and
tendency to reject Christian outgroups, while anthropocentrism was found
to be unrelated to rejection of Whites, a conclusion based on data
collected from four Black subjects.
Regarding hypothesis #8 , the prediction of a nonsignificant
correlation between anthropocentrism and favorability of one's philosophy
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Table 12
Relationship between Anthropocentrism and Various
Forms of Ethnocentrism

N

Mean
Scorec

Correlation with
Total Score on
Anthropocentrism Scale

Overall Ethnocentrism

74

-9.14

.358a

Rejection of Iranians

74

3.99

.360s

Rejection of Mexicans

74

-14.77

.294b

Rejection of Blacks

70

0.77

.283b

Rejection of Jews

73

-27.62

,248b

Rejection of Whites

4

11.25

Rejection of Christians

1

- 8.00

-.209

Significant at .01 level.
^Significant at .05 level.
cHigh positive scores indicate intense rejection of the
outgroup in question, whereas high negative scores indicate relative
acceptance of an outgroup.
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of human nature was confirmed by the data (r = .092, N.S.).

An ANOVA

examining the favorability of attitudes regarding human nature of high,
medium, and low anthropocentrism
between groups (F = 1.17, N.S.).

groups found no significant difference
Thus, there is no evidence of a

linear or curvilinear relationship between anthropocentrism and favor
ability of one's philosophy of human nature.
subscales on the Philosophies of

An examination of the

Human Nature Scale revealed that

attitudes regarding the trustworthiness, altruism, independence,
strength of will and rationality, and complexity of human nature were
unrelated to total score on the Anthropocentrism Scale.

However,

anthropocentrism was significantly related to belief in the variability
of human nature (r = -.314, £<.01).

That is, highly anthropocentric

individuals tend to minimize the extent of individual differences in,
and the basic changeability of human nature.
Results are also available regarding the relationship between
anthropocentrism and various demographic variables.

First of all, data

indicate no significant relationship between socioeconomic status and
total score on the Anthropocentrism Scale (r *» .130, N.S.).

Relation

ships between anthropocentrism and various categorical demographic
variables are summarized in Table 13.

ANOVA's indicate no significant

difference in level of anthropocentrism as a function of sex, religion,
race, political party, or political ideology.
Results of a stepwise regression analysis designed to predict
total score on the Anthropocentrism Scale are summarized in Table 14.
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Table 13
Separate ANOVA's Relevant to Relationships between
Categorical Demographic Variables
and Anthropocentrism

—

— g ----------------------------X

N

Total Score
Score on
Anthr op oce'ntrism
Scale

Males
Females

37
37

128.6
126.3

Catholics
Protestants
None
Jewish

43
20
6
1

131.1
125.5
118.8
101.0

Race

Whites
Blacks

70
4

126.9
136.5

Political
Party
Preference

Republicans
Democrats
Independents

29
30
13

128.8
131.3
117.1

Political
Ideology

Liberals
Conservatives

32
42

125.9
128.6

Variable

Group

Sex

Religion

F Value

E.

0.23

N.S.

1.35

N.S.

0.75

N.S.

2.10

N.S.

0.30

N.S.

aThe mean total score on the Anthropocentrism Scale for all 74
subjects was 127.5, with a standard deviation of 21.4
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Table 14
Stepvd.se3 Regression Analysis for Prediction of
Total Score on the Anthropocentrism Scale

Step

Variable Entered

R2

F

R

1

Ethnocentrism

.146

11.97

.0009

2

PHN Favorability

.175

7.33

.0013

3

Egocentrism

.198

'5.60

.0018

4

Socioeconomic Status

.203

4.27

.0039

5

Locus of Control

.203

3.36

.0092

aEach step adds one variable, and includes all variables used in
previous steps. Thus, for example, Step 3 involves the use of
ethnocentrism, PHN favorability, and egocentrism to predict total
score on the Anthropocentrism Scale.
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These five nonenvironmantal variables (Ethnocentrism, PHN Favorability,
Egocentrism, Socioeconomic Status, and Locus of Control) account for
20.3% of the variance in Anthropocentrism Scale total scores.

However,

the one variable model, using only ethnocentrism as a predictor,
accounts for 14.6% of the variance by itself.
values and the minimal increases in

Given the declining F

as one proceeds toward step 5 ,

it is evident that little is to be gained by the addition of predictor
variables other than ethnocentrism.

This is not surprising given the

data reported above, which indicates that ethnocentrism is the only one
of the five variables used in this regression analysis which correlates
significantly with total score on the Anthropocentrism Scale.
Data regarding the correlations between Anthropocentrism Scale
factors and other variables are summarized in Table 15, while signifi
cant relationships between Anthropocentrism Scale factors and categori
cal demographic variables are summarized in Table 16.
Factor #1:

In regard to

"Pure Anthropocentrism vs. Nonanthropocentrism," the

obtained correlations are quite similar to those obtained between total
score on the Anthropocentrism Scale and the set of variables in question.
Factor #1 is positively correlated with ethnocentrism, with total score
and both subscores derived from the Environmental Behavior List, and
with each of the four Kameron factors.

In other words, persons who

score high on Factor 1 (high in pure anthropocentrism) tend to reject
various outgroups, report involvement in anthropocentric behavior but
deny nonanthropocentric behavior, and tend to take an exploitationist
stance toward the environment including an endorsement of technological
growth.

Such persons also tend to be fearful of the outdoors while
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Table 15
Significant Product Moment Correlations between
Anthropocentrism Scale Factors and
Other Variables

AF1

AF2

AF3

AF4

.427a

.285d

.324c

-,270d -.365° -.269d -.4403

-,329c
.269d

•331c

.337c

KF1

,436a

.390b

.571a

.373°

KF2

,331c

KF3

.601a

KF4

.444a

.293d

.395b

.277d

.279d

.442a

.376b

.294d
,429a

.366°

Nonenvironmenta1
Variables
Internal
External
Locus of
Control
Egocentrism

PHN Favorability
Social Desirability
Set
Socioeconomic Status

AF9

•307c

.418a

Ethnocentrism

AF8

*

Environmental
Variables
Anthropocentric
Behavior Score
Nonanthropocentric
Behavior Score
Environmental
Behavior List
Total Score

AF7

•288d

aSignificant at the .0001 level
^Significant at the .001 level
Significant at the .01 level
^Significant at the .05 level

.305°
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Table 16
Significant3 ANOVAs Regarding Relationships between
Anthropocentrism Scale Factor Scores and
Categorical Demographic Variables

Anthropo
centrism
Scale
Factor
AF #1

AF #2

AF #3

AF #7

Demographic
Variable

Mean
Factor
Score F

Groups

N

Catholic
Protestant
None
Jewish

43
20
6
1

26.6
24.7 3.24
20.3
16.6

Political
Party
Preference

Republican
Democrat
Independent

29
30
13

26.5
25.7 3.24
21.7

Religion

None
Jewish
Catholic
Protestant

6
1
43
20

6.83
6.18 3.88
4.76
4.47

Catholic
Protestant
Jewish
None

43
20
1
6

6.85
6.19 3.54
3.82
3.39

Sex

Females
Males

37
37

7.08 6.50
5.55

Political
Party
Preference

Democrats
Republicans
Independents

30
29
13

7.07
6.39 3.35
4.84

Political
Ideology

Conservatives
Liberals

42
32

3.87 4.61
3.37

Religion

Religion

£

Results of
Duncan
Testb

p < .05

p < .05

B
B
B

A
A

A
A
B

p < .05

B
B
B

p < .05
B
B

A
A

A
A
A
A
B

p < .05

A
p < .05

B
B

p < .05

A
B

aAll ANOVA’s, for all eight scored factors and all five demo
graphic variables (sex, race, religion, political party, political
ideology) which are not listed were not significant.
^Means with the same letter are not significantly different
based on the Duncan Multiple Range Test.

76

endorsing a man under and hostile toward nature position.

In addition,

as indicated in Table 16, Catholics were found to score significantly
higher on this pure anthropocentrism factor than did nonreligious and
Jewish individuals.

Finally, persons identifying themselves as Demo

crats or Republicans scored significantly higher on Factor #1 than did
persons identifying themselves as Independents. Factor #1 was unrelated
to social desirability set, locus of control, egocentrism, PHN favor
ability, socioeconomic status, sex, race, and political ideology.
Factor #2:

"Other Species Poorly Adapted vs. Well Adapted and

Advanced," was significantly related to only two variables, social
desirability set, and religion.

A significant positive correlation was

found between Factor #2 and social desirability set, indicating that
persons who believe that other species are poorly adapted and relatively
unadvanced tend to give socially desirable responses.

In addition,

nonreligious individuals scored significantly higher on Factor #2 than
did Catholics and Protestants.

Factor #2 was unrelated to scores

derived from the Environmental Behavior List, and was also unrelated to
locus of control, egocentrism, ethnocentrism, PHN positivity, socio
economic status, the four Kameron factors, sex, race, political party
preference and political ideology.
Factor #3:

"Extraterrestial Life Unlikely vs. Likely," was re

lated to 6 other variables (see Tables 15 and 16).

Significant positive

correlations were obtained between Factor #3 and both the Anthropocentric Behavior Score and total EBL score, as well as with Kameron factors
#1 and #3, indicating that persons who believe that extraterrestial
life is unlikely

tend to endorse an exploitationist approach to the
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the environment, display a fear of outdoors, and report participation
in anthropocentric behaviors as well.

Factor 3 was also significantly

associated with religion, sex, and political party preference.

A belief

that extraterrestial life is unlikely is significantly more common among
Catholics and Protestants than among nonreligious individuals, is
significantly more common among females than males, and is significantly
more common among Democrats than among Independents.

Factor #3 was

unrelated to the EBL Nonanthropocentric Behavior Score, locus of control,
egocentrism, ethnocentrism, PHN favorability, social desirability set,
socioeconomic status, race, and political ideology.
Factor #4:

"Low vs. High Concern for Animals and Plants" was

significantly positively correlated with 6 other variables, as indicated
in Table 15.

Persons who display a low concern regarding the death of

animals and plants (high scorers on Factor 4) tend to report involvement
in anthropocentric behaviors while denying participation in nonanthropo
centric behaviors, are ethnocentric in outlook, endorse the exploitation
of the environment and the growth of technology, tend to be fearful of
the outdoors and adopt a man under and hostile toward nature position.
Factor 4 is unrelated to social desirability, locus of control, egocen
trism, PHN positivity, socioeconomic status, sex, race, religion,
political ideology and political party preference.
Factor #7 "Man unique and harmless vs. Man as destructive animal"
was related to four variables (see Tables

and 16).

Significant corre

lations were obtained between Factor 7 and the Nonanthropocentric
Behavior Score and total score from the Environmental Behavior List as
well as with KF1.

In other words, persons who view mankind as unique,
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set apart from the animal world, and nondestructive report that they
are unlikely to perform nonanthropocentric behavior, and tend to adopt
an exploitationist stance toward the environment.

Factor 7 was also sig

nificantly related to political ideology, with conservatives being more
likely than liberals to view mankind as unique and harmless.
Factor #8 :

"Welfare of Humans vs. Welfare of Animals" was

significantly related to only two of the 18 variables examined.

A sig

nificant correlation was obtained between Factor 8 and both the Non
anthropocentric Behavior Score and the total EBL score, indicating that
persons who place the welfare of humans well ahead of the welfare of
animals tend to deny involvement in nonanthropocentric behavior.
Factor #9:

"Exploitation vs. Protection of the Environment,

showed significant correlations with all three EBL scores, and with
Kameron's factors 1 and 3.

In other words, persons who espouse

exploitation of the environment tend to report anthropocentric behavior
while denying nonanthropocentric behaviors, tend to maintain a pro
technology stance, and endorse an exploitationist stance on Kameron's
scale as well.

Factor 9 showed no significant relations with any of the

other variables under consideration.
Of the five continuous variables whose content is unrelated to
environmental attitudes (locus of control, egocentrism, ethnocentrism,
PHN positivity, and socioeconomic status) only ethnocentrism was signifi
cantly related to any of the Anthropocentrism Scale factors.

Even

ethnocentrism was significantly correlated with only two factors.

Given

this lack of relatedness between predictor and criterion variables, a
canonical correlational analysis was deemed unnecessary.
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Correlations

among

variables other than those derived from

the Anthropocentrism Scale can be located in Table 17.

Table 17
Product Moment Correlations Between All Major Variables
Other Than Anthropocentrism Scale Variables

Ego

ETH

PHN
Fav

LoC

SES

SD

KF1

KF2

KF3

KF4

ABS

NBS

Egocentrism
Ethnocentrism

.177

PHN
Favorability

.046

-.221

Locus of Control

.046

.175

Socioeconomic
Status

.014

.043

.272d -.062

Social
Desirability

.294d

.161

.310° -.161

Kameron Factor 1

.074

.346c -.145

.117

.128

-.060

Kameron Factor 2

.062

.446a -.159

.102

.062

.148

.302c

Kameron Factor 3

.015

.353c -.046

.198

.216

-.085

,601a

•493a

Kameron Factor 4

.040

.272d

.126

.126

-.077

.463a

.228

.485a

Anthropocentric
Behavior Score

.087

.045

-.183

.267d

.045

-.225

.5703

.343

.541a

Nonanthropocentric
Behavior Score

.133

-.090

.153

Total Environmental
Behavior List Score--.131

.080

-.187

-.205

.030

-.115
,234d

.161

-.090
.083

.308c -.546a -.216
-.315c

•633a

,303c

.253d

-.4603 -.149
.5603

.216

-.519a
,805a -.925a

Significant at the .0001 level. Significant at the .001 level. Significant at the .01 level.
Significant at the .05 level.

EBL

DISCUSSION

Evidence regarding the construct validity of ’'anthropocen
trism" is available from both the factor analysis of the Anthropocen
trism Scale and the correlations between anthropocentrism and other
constructs.

First of all, a "pure anthropocentrism" factor accounting

for nearly 20% of the variance emerged as the first factor for the
Anthropocentrism Scale.

The emergence of such a first factor supports

the view that anthropocentrism is a useful construct which identifies
a common thread running through a variety of attitudes regarding man
kind's position and role in nature.

Analysis of the five items which

load highest on Factor 1 indicates that each is an abstract item which
posits human preeminence.

This value judgement maintaining that

humans are more important than and superior to the rest of creation
has previously been identified as the central tenet of anthropocen
trism.

Given data indicating that items which express this core

anthropocentric value judgement have the highest item-test correlations
(Chandler, Note 1) as well as the highest loadings on the main factor
derived from the Anthropocentrism Scale, the utility of the construct
"anthropocentrism" is apparent.
The relationship between anthropocentrism and various reported
behaviors was also established in this study.

Given the significant

moderate correlations obtained between total score on the Anthropocen
trism Scale and each of the three scores derived from the Environmental
Behavior List, it is apparent that anthropocentric attitudes are
related to reported behaviors.

However, since the honesty and
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accuracy of subjects' reports regarding their actual behavior cannot be
ascertained, the finding of a significant relationship between social
desirability and total EBL Score (see Table 17) suggests that these
self-reports be viewed cautiously.

Thus, although the magnitude of

the correlations between anthropocentrism and reported behavior is
substantial, the measurement of actual behavior will be necessary to
clearly establish the "behavioral validity" of anthropocentrism as a
construct.
Correlational data in Table 11 do, nonetheless, suggest which
types of behavior may be most likely to be associated with an anthro
pocentric outlook.

Of the 31 reported behaviors on the Environmental

Behavior List, 12 were significantly correlated with anthropocentrism.
Specifically, anthropocentric individuals are more likely than non
anthropocentric individuals to report a preference for driving large
cars, a tendency to litter, a reluctance to use busses, bicycles, or
carpools to conserve energy, and a tendency to adjust their thermo
stats to obtain comfort rather than to conserve energy.

In addition,

anthropocentric individuals report that they are more likely to vote
for business oriented rather than environmentally oriented political
candidates, less likely to subscribe to ecological publications or
support environmental groups via financial contributions or personal
attendance of meetings, and less likely than nonanthropocentric
persons to deliberately purchase nonpolluting products.

These re

ported behaviors can thus serve as the starting point in the investi
gation of the network of actual behaviors which are associated with an
anthropocentric outlook.
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A network of hypotheses was developed relating anthropocentrism
to a variety of hypothetical constructs as well.

Perhaps the most

striking of the findings in this regard is the significant positive
correlation obtained between anthropocentrism and ethnocentrism.

This

finding supports the view that, from one angle, anthropocentrism can
be seen as an extension of ethnocentric thinking.

It will be recalled

that Adorno et al. had maintained that the ethnocentric individual's
need for an outgroup prevents formation of an identification with
humanity as a whole.

Given the obtained correlation between PHN

Favorability (degree of positivity of attitudes toward mankind) and
ethnocentrism (r“-.221, £<.06), it is evident at very least that
ethnocentric individuals do not view humanity in a highly favorable
light when asked to evaluate humanity in the absence of an outgroup.
Such data provides some support for the contention of Adorno et al.
However, contrary to the assumption of Adorno et al., it is possible
to contrast man with a suitable outgroup (the nonhuman environment),
if one transcends the intraspecies level of analysis.

And, when

provided with such an outgroup, it is clear that the ethnocentric
individual does indeed identify with mankind as an ingroup and view
the nonhuman environment as an outgroup to be opposed (as indicated
by the significant positive correlation between ethnocentrism and
anthropocentrism).

Thus, a slight modification is called for in the

dynamics of ethnocentrism proposed by Adorno et al.

It now appears

that the ethnocentric individual does not tend to identify with man
kind as a whole, unless provided with a suitable outgroup.

When

provided with such an outgroup, the ethnocentric individual does
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indeed identify with mankind as an ingroup, and anthropocentrism there
by becomes a natural extension of ethnocentric thinking.
The finding of a nonsignificant correlation between anthropo
centrism and PHN Favorability indicates that these two constructs are
separate entities, as hypothesized.

In other words, one's attitudes

toward mankind per se can be quite different from one's attitudes
regarding the relative value of man in relation to the nonhuman environ
ment.

Again, the provision of an outgroup, against which man can be

evaluated, has a substantial impact on the way in which a given indi
vidual evaluates mankind.

This finding of a nonsignificant relation

ship between anthropocentrism and PHN Favorability satisfies one
requirement for discriminant validity for the construct anthropocen
trism.
A nonsignificant relationship was also observed between anthro
pocentrism and egocentrism.

Combined with a nonsignificant correlation

between egocentrism and ethnocentrism, this finding suggests that the
dynamics of ethnocentric/anthropocentric thinking cannot be extended all
the way down to the basic ingroup "oneself."

In other words, persons

who take a self-centered approach in their relations with other indi
viduals do not necessarily apply this self-centered approach to
ingroup-outgroup relations (whether that outgroup be ethnic or non
human).

Given the similar findings in the 1978 Chandler study, it is

now evident that anthropocentrism is unrelated to egocentrism, regard
less of which facet of egocentrism one is investigating (self
preoccupation, selfishness, or self-aggrandizement).
In regard to Kameron's factors (KFl, KF2, etc.), expectations
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that anthropocentric individuals would endorse exploitation of the
environment and the growth of technology were clearly confirmed by the
obtained data.

Analyzing the correlations between anthropocentrism

and all four Kameron factors, the meaning of anthropocentrism in terms
of the man-nature value trichotomy (man over/with/under nature) can be
determined.

Given the significant positive correlations between

anthropocentrism and all four Kameron factors, it is evident that non
anthropocentric individuals tend to adopt a man-with-nature position,
rejecting the man-over-nature and man-under (and hostile toward)nature orientations.

That is, nonanthropocentric persons tend to

accept the man-with-nature items that lead to low scores on KF1 and
KF2, thereby adopting a conservationist stance and a nonfearful
approach to the environment.

In addition, nonanthropocentric indi

viduals tend to reject the man-over-nature items which are associated
with a pro-technology stance on KF4, and tend also to reject the manunder (and hostile toward)-nature items of KF2.

Thus, it is evident

that nonanthropocentric individuals tend to adopt the man-with-nature
value orientation.
On the other hand, it appears that an anthropocentric stance can
be associated with either a man-over-nature or a man-under-nature posi
tion.

Anthropocentric individuals tend to agree with the man-over-

nature items of KF4, thereby adopting a pro-technology stance.

When

given a choice between a man-with-nature (non-fear of outdoors) or a manunder-nature (fear of outdoors) position on KF3, anthropocentric individ
uals choose the man-under-nature stance.

And when given the choice of

accepting or rejecting the man-under (and hostile toward)-nature

items of KF2, anthropocentric individuals again adopt the man-undernature orientation.

Thus, whereas nonanthropocentric individuals tend

to adopt a man-with-nature equalitarian stance vis-a-vis the environ
ment, the anthropocentric individual tends to adopt a more competitive
view of the relation of man and nature.

Man is seen as either over

nature, and thereby able to exploit the environment via his mastery of
technology, or man is seen as capable of being subdued by nature, with
this perception giving rise to fear of, and hostility toward the
environment.

That is, the anthropocentric individual tends to see

man-nature interactions as a battle for control, with man unable to
control nature in some respects, yet capable of and entitled to exer
cise such control in other areas.

This view of the relationship

between man and nature is reminiscent of the ethnocentric individual's
view of ingroup-outgroup relations as a competitive battle for mastery.
In regard to locus of control, it was earlier assumed that locus
of control would be related to man-nature value orientations, with manover-nature types.maintaining an internal locus of control, and manunder-nature types adopting an external locus of control.

It was also

assumed that anthropocentrism would be associated solely with the
man-over-nature position, and that anthropocentrism would therefore be
associated with an internal locus of control.
assumptions are false on both counts.

Data indicate that these

First of all, the nonsignificant

correlations obtained (see Table 17) between locus of control and both
KF2 (composed primarily of man-under-nature items) and KF4 (composed
primarily of man-over-nature items) indicate that there is no consis
tent relationship between locus of control and man-nature value
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orientations.

That is, perception of locus of control in one's life

is unrelated to one's perception of whether man or the environment
controls the balance of power in man-nature interactions.

Secondly

as indicated above, anthropocentrism is associated with a man-undernature orientation as well as a man-over-nature orientation.

Given

this unexpected finding that anthropocentric individuals see the
balance of power (locus of control) in man-environment relations as
being variable, it is perhaps unsurprising that anthropocentrism is
unrelated to Rotter's internal-external locus of control variable.
However, it should be noted that small but significant posi
tive correlations were observed (see Table 17) between locus of
control and total EBL score as well as the Anthropocentric Behavior
Score derived from the EBL.

In other words, it is apparent that

persons who report engaging in supposedly anthropocentric behavior
tend to maintain an external locus of control.

While the size of

this correlation is minimal, it suggests that the relationship between
anthropocentrism and locus of control might profitably be explored in
greater detail.

It would also be interesting to assess the relation

ship between anthropocentrism and other types of control, such as
tendency toward interpersonal dominance and capacity to delay gratifi
cation (since anthropocentrism seemingly involves sacrificing the
environment for the sake of more immediate, transient needs).
Although no significant findings emerged when the relationships
between anthropocentrism and various demographic variables were tested,
there are indications that further investigation of these relationships
may also be profitable.

First of all, religion was found to be
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significantly related to AF1:

"pure anthropocentrism."

Secondly,

the method employed herein was not designed to examine all groups, or
to provide equal N*s for those groups which were examined within each
of the five categorical demographic variables.

As a result, the

obtained sample size for some groups was too small to permit reliable
generalization of findings to the populations from which these samples
were to be drawn.

Reference to Table 13 indicates that this diffi

culty was quite marked when testing the relationships between anthro
pocentrism and both race and religion.

Given this situation, plus the

Kluckhohn and Strodtbeck (1961) findings regarding cultural differences
in preference for various man-nature value orientations, a more power
ful test of oultural differences in anthropocentrism may prove fruitful.
Specifically, a cross cultural study designed to systematically assess
anthropocentrism as a function of race, religion, and continent or
country of residence would allow us to generalize findings beyond the
primarily Western White Christian population examined herein.
In reviewing the various findings relevant to the construct
validity of anthropocentrism, it is evident that "anthropocentrism" is
a useful construct which identifies a common thread, or value, which
permeates a variety of attitudes regarding man-nature interactions.
This construct is also significantly related to reported behavior, and
has been shown to be closely related to the construct "ethnocentrism."
In addition, it is clear that anthropocentrism taps the level of
importance attributed to man relative to the non-human environment.
This construct can thus be distinguished from attitudes toward
humanity per se. as required for discriminant validity.

The meaning of
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anthropocentrism in terms of man-nature value orientations (man-over/
under/with-nature) has also been established. Thus, a good deal can be
said regarding the meaning of the construct anthropocentrism.

However,

as indicated by the regression analysis, the meaning of anthropocen
trism in terms of constructs unrelated to man-nature values is largely
unknown (only 20 percent of the variance in anthropocentrism is
accounted for by these variables). Anthropocentrism is unrelated to
egocentrism, locus of control, and socio-economic status.

Of the

various nonenvironmental constructs examined, only ethnocentrism

has

been found useful in illuminating the meaning of the construct anthro
pocentrism.

Thus, it would be helpful to examine the relationship

between anthropocentrism and additional nonenvironmental variables
(e.g., interpersonal dominance, capacity to delay gratification).
Future research might also profitably explore anthropocentrism in terms
of actual ecologically related behaviors, cross cultural variables,
and variables which have been shown to be associated with ethnocen
trism and prejudice.
Regarding the validity of the Anthropocentrism Scale as an
operational measure of anthropocentrism, the following can be said.
First of all, it is evident that responses to the Anthropocentrism
Scale are not significantly affected by social desirability response
sets.

Although this response bias could possibly become a problem in

the future as the social desirability of ecological consciousness in
our society changes, it is clear that social desirability bias is not
a confounding variable at this time.

Factor analytic data can be

brought to bear on the question of whether there is excessive content
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specific variance built into the Anthropocentrism Scale.

The emergence

of a fairly broad "pure anthropocentrism" first factor, whose highest
loading factors are abstract rather than concrete and specific in con
tent, supports the view that irrelevant content specific variance is
not extensive.

On the other hand, AF3 ("extraterrestral life likely vs.

unlikely") is clearly a highly content specific factor whose content is
too peripheral to anthropocentrism to be given such prominence.

Aside

from this overemphasis on extraterrestial life, it appears that the
factors derived from the Anthropocentrism Scale each tap general issues
regarding man-nature relations, rather than irrelevant content specific
issues.

Thus, although irrelevant content specific variance may be

excessive, it is clearly not extensive.
The more important content validity question revolves about the
fact that the universe of possible manifestations of anthropocentrism
remains largely unknown.

Accordingly, there may be some content areas

which are not sufficiently tapped by the Anthropocentrism Scale.

Once

the universe of manifestations of anthropocentrism is better known,
a scale with better content validity may be obtainable.

In the meantime,

AF1 can be used as a measure of "pure anthropocentrism," given its
emphasis on abstract rather than concrete content specific issues. The
use of AF1 would thus complement the use of total score on the Anthro
pocentrism Scale, which relies much more extensively on the assessment
of specific attitudes related to anthropocentrism.

Summary
In conclusion, anthropocentrism has been established as a useful
construct which identifies a basic value judgement, that humans are

rightfully preeminent in the natural world, as an important contribu
tor to a variety of attitudes and reported behaviors relevant to mannature interactions.

This construct has been found to be closely

related to ethnocentrism, but a need remains to tie anthropocentrism
to other nonenvironmental constructs in order to illuminate further
the basis for adoption of anthropocentric values and attitudes. As a
measure of anthropocentrism, the Anthropocentrism Scale has been found
adequate at present, though a better scale may be

obtainable once the

universe of manifestations of anthropocentrism is better delineated.
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APPENDIX A

The Anthropocentrism Scale
The statements on the following pages refer to a variety of
Issues for which different people have quite different opinions.
Please read each statement carefully, and indicate as accurately as
possible your degree of agreement or disagreement with each statement,
using the following scale:
+3:
+2:
+1:
0:
*■1:
-2:
-3:

Strong Agreement
Moderate Agreement
Slight Agreement
Neutrality; Cannot Agree or Disagree
Slight Disagreement
Moderate Disagreement
Strong Disagreement

Place the number which best represents your personal point of view on
the line provided to the left of each item.
_____

1.

The differences between human beings and animals are more
numerous than the similarities.

2.

It is quite possible that highly advanced civilizations exist
in other parts of the universe.

3.

Man should control the environment for his own benefit as
much as possible.

______ 4.

The human species is without a doubt the most advanced form
of life on earth.

5.

It is wrong to pick flowers for their beauty value, because
in so doing, we destroy the life of the flower.

6.

Man is the most important species on earth.

7.

It is wrong for scientists to try to find cures for human
diseases by experimentally producing these diseases in
animals.

8.

Most animals and plants seem to be better adapted to
their environments than man is to his environment.

9.

If we eventually discover life in other parts of the universe,
such life will probably be found to be inferior to human life.

_____ 10.

Humans should show more respect for the rights of animals
and plants.
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11.

Man is better equipped to survive environmental disasters
than any other species.

12.

It is best to think of man as just one of many members of
the animal world.

13.

When driving a car, one should go out of his way to avoid
animals crossing the road, even at the risk of an accident
with another automobile.

14.

Humans are superior to all other animals in all important
respects.

15.

It is likely that "flying saucers" are presently visiting
earth.

16.

I sometimes feel that the killing of an animal is just as
wrong as the killing of a human being.

17.

Degree of intelligence ought to be the main measure for
determining the superiority of one species over another.

18.

If there actually is an afterlife, animals are just as likely
as humans to take part in such a life after death.

19.

Protecting the environment is more important than the produc
tion of consumer goods.

20.

I prefer the benefits of city life over the benefits of life
in the country.

21.

Governments should adopt policies which ensure the survival
of the human species, even if other species become extinct
as a result.

22.

No matter how we define "superiority," it seems that man must
be considered superior to all known forms of life.

23.

The universe would be much better off if humans did not exist.

24.

I occasionally feel that it is morally wrong to eat meat.

25.

If I could choose my own afterlife, I would like to be some
thing other than a human being for a change.

26.

Many animals and plants are far more advanced than most
people like to believe.

27.

I usually enjoy science fiction novels and films.

28.

Sometimes my conscience prevents me from killing bothersome
flies and insects.
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29.

Man is the most significant entity in the universe.

30.

The primary value of an animal or plant lies in its ability
to serve human needs.
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APPENDIX B

Anthropocentrism Scale Standardization Dataf
Standard
Item # Mean® Deviation”
28
3
4
5®

6
7I

8S
9
10®
11
12®
13®
14
15®
16®
17
18®
19®
20
21
22
23®
24®

25I
U t

27®
28g
29
30

4.06
2.30
4.42
6.02
4.77
4.80
5.39
2.85
2.91
2.23
4.42
3.92
5.37
4.49
3.49
3.15
3.60
3.69
2.75
3.49
2.88
4.56
5.65
5.48
5.20
2.62
3.09
4.95
3.93
2.85

1.93
1.51
2.08
1.50
1.88
2.20
1.63
1.82
1.48
1.27
2.00
2.07
1.70
1.99
1.78
1.94
2.04
2.14
1.61
1.95
1.77
2.11
1.71
1.84
2.06
1.59
1.94
2.16
2.07
1.79

Item-Test Correlations
Form lc Form 2 Form 3* Mean
.435
.345
.558
.606
.271
.697
.327
.266
.313
.452
.470
.583
.288
.642
.201
.298
.410
.358
.304
.293
.581
.637
.187
.276
.378
.439
.177
.385
.706
.530

.322
.328
.226
.496
.371
.665
.485
.322
.426
.429
.352
.470
.465
.605
.275
.583
.409
.393
.260
.121
.428
.544
.510
.599
.448
.441
.341
.538
.520
.239

.383
.372
.328
.480
.423
.618
.230
.266
.467
.456
.281
.567
.381
.656
.301
.535
.306
.533
.364
.355
.487
.590
.294
.431
.303
.549
.231
.396
.563
.564

.380
.348
.371
.537
.355
.660
.347
.285
.402
.446
.368
.540
.378
.634
.259
.472
.393
.428
.309
.256
.305
.590
.330
.435
.376
.476
.250
.440
.596
.444

Reliabilj
.536
.894
.570
.641
.731
.394
.376
.462
.617
.572
.518
.615
.695
.451
.803
.717
.540
.691
.420
.572
.517
.708
.570
.747
.776
.682
.905
.878
.622
.418

a See Chandler (Note 1) for additional details
^Based on 30 item (final form of) Anthropocentrism Scale; N = 185.
cBased on the initial 35 item form of the AnthropocentrismScale,
.from which 5 items were
later dropped; N = 53.
Based on the 32 item form of the Anthropocentrism Scale, from which
2 items were later dropped; N ** 63.
eBased on the final form(30 items) of the Anthropocentrism Scale;
N = 185.
*Test - retest correlations; N * 63.
^Negatively phrased item whose scoring is reversed prior to applica
tion of other statistical procedures. Raw
scores range from -3to
+3 on all items. After reversing the sign
of responses to
negatively phrased items, and adding +4 to
the score of each ofthe
30 items, item scores range from +1 to +7, with high scores being
relatively anthropocentric.

PLEASE NOTE:
Copyrighted materials in this document
have not been filmed at the request of
the author. They are available for
consultation, however, in the author's
university library.
These consist of pages:
101-114
118-122

University
Microfilms
International
3 0 0 N. Z EE B RD .. ANN A R B O R . Ml 4 8 1 0 6 (3131 761 -4 7 0 0
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APPENDIX G

The Environmental Behavior List
Please read each of the following statements carefully, and
determine whether each statement is true or false in describing your
behavior. If a given statement is true, place a "T" on the line to
the left of that item; if false, place an "F" on the line provided.
Please keep your actual behavior in mind when considering each
statement.
_____

1.

I keep track of my senators' and congressman's voting
records on environmental issues.

_____ 2.a I have used pesticides to protect my plants when necessary.
3.

I subscribe to one or more ecological publications.

4.

I can clearly remember having bought a product specifically
because it had a lower polluting effect.

5.a I kill cockroaches when they appear in my living quarters.
_____ 6.

I go out of my way to buy products in recyclable containers,
despite the hassle.

_____

7.

I have attended at least one meeting concerned with
ecological or environmental issues.

8.

I save newspapers for collection during paper recycling drives.

9.

Because of my beliefs regarding the effects of overpopulation,
I will limit the size of my family to two children or less.

_____

10.a I have used aerosol cans occasionally during the last few
years.
11.a When possible, I prefer to drive a fairly large car rather
than an economy size car.

aIndicates an item which describes an anthropocentric behavior.
The item is scored +1 if marked "True," 0 if marked "False," thereby
giving rise to an anthropocentric behavior score ranging from 0 to 11.
All other items describe nonanthropocentric behaviors. These items are
also scored +1 if marked "True," 0 if marked "False," thereby resulting
in a nonanthropocentric behavior score ranging from 0 to 20. The
Total Environmental Behavior List Score is obtained by subtracting the
nonanthropocentric behavior score from the anthropocentric behavior
score.
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12.a When I vote, I'm more likely to support a candidate who
supports growth of the economy and of business, than a
candidate who supports putting controls on business in order
to protect the environment.
,
13.

I keep my thermostat set at 78 degrees or above in the summer,
and 65 degrees or below in the winter, in order to conserve
energy and reduce pollution.

14.

I have attended an anti-nuclear power meeting.

15.

I have written to a newspaper or legislator regarding the
adverse effects of pollution.

16.a I often buy products contained in no deposit/no return bottles.
17.

I can clearly remember switching products for environmental
reasons.

18.

I have at times taken a bus or bicycle across town, even
when 1 had a car available to me, in order to reduce pollu
tion of the environment.

19.

I have been involved in at least one litter cleanup drive.

20.

I have contributed money to an organization whose main task
is to protect the natural environment.

21.a If I'm honest with myself, I have to admit that I sometimes
throw small pieces of litter on the ground, or out of my car
window.
22.

I have at times boycotted products because they were made by
companies found guilty of damaging the natural environment.

23.

I have used a recycling center for bottles or cans at least
once within the last year.

24.a When I think about it, I realize that I do little or nothing
to protect or improve the environment.
25.

I am willing to put a brick in my toilet in order to reduce
its water consumption, and I will do so soon.

26.a Even though use of carpools, buses, bikes, etc. reduce pollu
tion, I prefer the convenience of a car.
27.

I have reduced my electricity consumption by 20% or more over
the last two years.

117

28.

I am very willing to pay, out of my own earnings, an addi
tional tax of 50 dollars a year, to be used specifically to
improve the natural environment.

29.a I don't go out of my way to protect the environment, since
that's the government's job.
30.

I can remember a period in my life when I was a vegetarian
because 1 felt it was morally wrong to eat meat.

31.a I turn on my air conditioner or heater when the temperature
is uncomfortable to me, regardless of energy consumption.
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APPENDIX I

DEMOGRAPHICS FORM3
Please provide the information requested below, but do NOT
include your name on this or any other form in the research packet.
Your participation in this research project is sincerely appreciated.
Age: ______
Sex: Male
Female
Race:

White
Black
Hispanic
Oriental
Other: ________________

Major Subject Area (current or anticipated) at L.S.U. _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
Religious Preference: _____________________
Political Party Preference:

Political Ideology:

Citizenship:

Republican
Democrat
Independent

Liberal
Conservative

U.S.A.
Other: ____________

Fill in the following blanks in respect to the "status person" in
your parents' household. This person is the one regarded as "head of
the household."
1.

Education (highest level attained): _________________

2.

Occupation (Exact: e.g., carpenter, bookkeeper, auto mechanic,
grade school teacher, etc.):

3.

Source of Income (wages or salary, inherited money, commissions,
stocks & bonds, etc., or any combination of these):

aScoring of socioeconomic status section (last three items above)
was adapted from McGuire & White (1955).
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